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1. Introduction 
Since the late 1980s, there has been a vigorous debate among both 
judges and academics about the appropriateness of a textualist approach to 
statutory interpretation and of the use of legislative history. 1 Justices Scalia 
and Thomas, the leading proponents of textualism on the Supreme Court, 
have frequently written or joined decisions that anger environmental advo-
cacy groups.2 In City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,3 how-
ever, their textualist approach to statutory interpretation resulted in a 
victory for the Environmental Defense Fund. 
1. See infra notes 12-43 and accompanying text. 
2. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.) (fmding that South Carolina's Beachfront Management 
Act, which prohibited building of any structure in designated "coastal zone," constituted per 
se taking of property by depriving owner of all economicaIly viable use of land); Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-73 (1992) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J., writing 
plurality opinion and joined by Thomas, J.) (denying standing to chaIlenge Department of 
Interior action under citizen suit provision of Endangered Species Act without showing that 
agency's action affected "concrete interest" of plaintiffs); Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. 
v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190,206 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J.) (finding that Federal Aviation 
Administration could limit discussion of alternatives in environmental impact statement to 
those proposed by private applicant); Richard J. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of 
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund: Searching for Plain Meaning in Unambiguous 
Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 n.3 (1995) (citing Justice Scalia's aIlegedly anti-
environmentalist decisions); infra notes 128-29, 181-85, and accompanying text. 
3. 511 U.S. 328 (1994). 
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As a result, Professor Lazarus, who argued the City of Chicago case 
before the Supreme Court on behalf of the Environmental Defense Fund,4 
and Ms. Newman, who worked with Lazarus on the case,s contend that, 
contrary to the expectations of environmentalists who believe that most 
judges associated with textualism are hostile to environmentalism, a plain 
meaning approach to statutory construction is more likely to result in 
victories for environmentalists because environmental statutes on their face 
usually contain broad aspirationallanguage and no exceptions.6 Most often, 
it is industry rather than environmental groups that seek exceptions from a 
statute's text by trying to find flexibility in its legislative history, "the 
content of which tends to be the product of hard-fought and lengthy debate 
among committee staff members and interest groups."7 Professor Lazarus 
and Ms. Newman concede that in some cases a statute's legislative history 
is more favorable to environmental plaintiffs than its text, but they conclude 
that a textualist approach to statutory construction "is likely to inure fre-
quently (but not exclusively) to the benefit of environmental plaintiffs."8 
This Article provides both anecdotal evidence and a more theoretical 
argument for why textualist statutory interpretation is not the best approach 
to address environmental. issues. Part IV provides some counterexamples 
that show it is not clear that a textualist approach will lead to more victories 
for environmental plaintiffs. More importantly, textualism does not provide 
the best method to resolve the frequent conflict in environmental statutes 
between protecting the public health and limiting the cost of regulation, 
especially because textualists tend to slight the balance struck by the envi-
ronmental agency. Judges applying a textualist approach often read envi-
ronmental statutes narrowly to limit the authority of environmental agen-
cies. Moreover, the textualist method is sufficiently indeterminate that a 
.textualist judge could have decided even the City of Chicago case either for 
or against environmental advocacy groups. Even if textualist statutory 
interpretation resulted in more victories for environmental advocacy groups, 
the tendency of textualists to place so little value on the interpretations of 
the environmental agencies that have greater practical experience with the 
4. See Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 1 n.a. 
5. Id. 
6. See id. at 23. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson, 
Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 
COLUM. L. REv. 1429 (1978) (discussing frequent use of aspirationallanguage in environ-
mental statutes and problems often caused by such language). 
7. Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 23. 
8. Id. 
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underlying issues raises serious questions about whether textualism is the 
best way to decide environmental policies. 
In addition, Professor Lazarus and Ms. Newman suggest that courts 
should ignore a statute's legislative history because such material is more 
likely to contain pro-industry provisions than the text.9 Even assuming they 
are right, Part V demonstrates that interpreters ought to consider a statute's 
legislative history because such material is often essential in understanding 
Congress's intent in enacting a bill. 
Part VI explains that a fundamental problem with textualism is that it 
downplays the role of administrative agencies in interpreting complex 
regulatory statutes. Thus, textualist judges too often ignore the spirit of the 
Supreme Court's decision, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 10 which emphasized that agencies generally are more 
competent at interpreting complex regulatory statutes than are generalist 
Article m judges, and as a result, these textualists fail to give sufficient 
deference to the expertise of environmental agencies. Even if the Lazarus-
Newman thesis that environmentalist groups would win more often if courts 
consistently employed a textualist approach is correct, it is better policy to 
allow environmental agencies to consider both Congress's intent in adopting 
the statute and the agency's assessment of the costs and benefits of various 
interpretations. Sometimes society is better off if an agency ignores a text's 
apparent meaning and allows industry a cost-saving exemption or exception 
from the statute's literal requirements. II 
Part II discusses the textualist approach to statutory interpretation and 
its critics. Part ill examines the impact of textualism on judicial application 
of the Chevron doctrine. Part IV provides some anecdotal evidence for 
why textualism will not always lead to victories for environmentalists and 
makes the broader argument that textualist judges often disregard the 
delicate balance struck by agencies between cost and safety. Part IV.A 
shows that Congress often limits broad aspirationallanguage in an environ-
mental statute with more restrictive terms in its implementing provisions 
and maintains that agencies are more adept at balancing conflicting textual 
language than textualistjudges. Part IV.B demonstrates how courts can use 
a textualist approach to limit the authority of environmental agencies. Part 
IV.C illustrates why the textualist method is sufficiently indeterminate that 
a textualist judge can decide many cases either for or against environmental 
advocacy groups. Part V discusses why interpreters should consider a 
9. Id. 
10. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
11. See· infra text accompanying note 289. 
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statute's legislative history. Part VI explains why a narrow textualist 
approach to statutory interpretation is inconsistent with the essence of the 
Chevron doctrine and proposes that courts should give considerable weight 
to an environmental agency's expertise in interpreting complex environmen-
tal statutes. 
II. The Impact of Textualist Statutory Interpretation 
It is important to understand the major theories of statutory interpreta-
tion before examining how these different approaches can affect how courts 
or agencies interpret environmental statutes. There are three major or 
"foundationalist" theories of statutory interpretation: (1) intentionalism, 
(2) purposivism, and (3) textu:Uism. 12 Intentionalists traditionally examine 
both a statute's text and legislative history to determine the original intent 
of the enacting legislature. 13 By contrast, purposivists go beyond the 
legislature's original intent to estimate the statute's spirit or purpose because 
either it may be difficult to determine the statute's original intent or a court 
must apply a statute to circumstances that the enacting legislature did not 
foresee. 14 If there are ambiguities in a statute, many purposivists try to 
12. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as 
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 324-25 (1990) (arguing that three major 
theories of statutory interpretation are "foundationalist" because "each seeks an objective 
ground (,foundation') that will reliably guide the interpretations of all statutes in all situa-
tions"); Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose 
Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 
199,211 n.46 (1996) (citing numerous articles on statutory construction); see also WILLIAM 
N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13-47 (1994) (discussing 
weaknesses of intentionalism, purposivism, and textualism). 
13. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 14-25 (describing and criticizing intentionalism); 
John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 298-99 
(1990); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 327; Watson, supra note 12, at 211-12; see 
also Dwyer, supra, at 298 n.267 (listing intentionalist scholars). Dwyer lists the following 
as examples of articles by leading intentionalists: Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, 
Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423, 424 (1988) (stating that "[iJn our 
view, public choice theory is consistent with a flexible, pragmatic approach to statutory 
construction, in which legislative intent plays an important role"); Richard A. Posner, The 
Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827 (1988); Kenneth W. Starr, Of Forests 
and Trees: Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 703 
(1988). 
14. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 25-34 (describing and criticizing purposivism); 
Watson, supra note 12, at 212, 214-15; see also HENRy M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, 
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING & ApPLICATION OF LAW 1378 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (discussing classic formulation 
of purposivist approach to statutory interpretation). For example, the Massachusetts 
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construe the statute in light of the assumption that the legislature was acting 
for the public good rather than for some narrow interest group. 15 
More recently, some scholars have proposed to go beyond intentional-
ism or purposivism. Some proponents of "dynamic" statutory interpretation 
urge judges to reformulate statutes, especially those concerned with civil 
rights, in light of "public values. "16 Other scholars have proposed various 
modified versions of intentionalism or p'urposivism that emphasize the need 
for statutory interpreters to apply a "practical reason" that appropriately fits 
general or ambiguous language to specific contextsl7 or takes into account 
"how statutory interpretation will improve or impair the performance of 
governmental institutions. "18 
Justice Holmes, an early advocate of a textualist approach to statutory 
interpretation, argued that- courts should be concerned only with what 
Supreme Judicial Court's Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. concluded that a statute 
requiring "written votes" allowed the use of voting machines which used no paper at all 
because the general purpose of the statute was to prevent oral or hand voting. See In re 
House Bill No. 1291, 60 N.B. 129, 130 (Mass. 1901); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS 
OF JURISPRUDENCE 267 (1990). 
15. See HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 1378 (noting how "reasonable [legislators] 
pursu[e] reasonable purposes reasonably"); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: 
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARv. L. 
REv. 381, 407 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through 
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 250-56 (1986) 
(arguing that courts in interpreting statutes should not enforce "hidden-implicit" bargains 
favoring special interest groups, but rather should treat statutes as having public meaning); 
Watson, supra note 12, at 212,215. But see POSNER, supra note 14, at 276-78 (arguing 
that it is difficult for courts to know whether legislature's purpose in enacting statute was 
to serve public interest or to reach compromise among interest groups). 
16. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 148-51; Dwyer, supra note 13, at 299 n.273. 
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989). 
17. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 322 n.3 (explaining that "[b]y 'practical 
reason,' we mean an approach that eschews objectivist theories in favor of a mixture of 
inductive and deductive reasoning (similar to the practice of the common law), seeking 
contextuaIjustification for the best legal answer among the potential alternatives"); Farber 
& Frickey, supra note 13, at 469 (proposing "public choice theory" as practical reasoning 
approach to understanding legislative intent that would allow judges "as many tools as 
possible to help them in the difficult task of applying statutes"). See generally Daniel A. 
Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 
VAND. L. REv. 533 (1992) (criticizing formalist approaches to statutory interpretation, 
including textuaIism, and arguing in favor of practical reason or Llewellyn's situation sense 
that examines problem of statutory interpretation in light of statutory context or purpose). 
18. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 
405, 466 (1989); see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING 
THE REGULATORY STATE 113-17 (1990). 
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Congress said and not what it meant. 19 Since the late 1980s, Justices 
Scalia,20 Thomas,21 and to a lesser extent, Kennedy22 have emphasized a 
"new textualist" approach to statutory interpretation.23 Textualists generally 
oppose both intentionalist and purposivist theories of statutory construction 
because intentionalists and purposivists give the judiciary too great a role 
in deciding the meaning of a statute.24 Instead, textualists argue that a 
statute's text alone provides the best evidence of the enacting legislature's 
original intent.25 Textualists commonly oppose the use of extrinsic sources, 
such as legislative history, when judges interpret statutory text. 26 Rather, 
19. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 41, 44 (Mark DeWolfe 
Howe ed., 1963); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. 
L. REv. 417, 419 (1899). On occasion, however, Justice Holmes went beyond his textualist 
theory to look at a statute's purpose. See, e.g., In re House Bill No. 1291, 60 N.E. 129, 
130 (Mass. 1901) (finding that statute's requirement of "written votes" allowed use of voting 
machines which used no paper at all because general purpose of statute was to prevent oral 
or hand voting); POSNER, supra note 14, at 267. 
20. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 u.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(advocating textualist approach to statutory interpretation). 
21. See infra notes 128-29 and' accompanying text. 
22. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 472-78 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Although he was initially Justice Scalia's closest ally on the 
Court, in recent years Justice Kennedy has been willing on some occasions to join opinions 
relying upon legislative history. See, e.g., Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 510 
U.S. 601, 610 n.4 (1991); Farber, supra note 17, at 546 n.76. 
23. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 120 (contrasting "Kennedy's lenient textualism" 
with "Scalia's dogmatic textualism"); id. at 226-34 (discussing and criticizing Scalia's "new 
textualism"); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 
969,990-91 (1992) [hereinafter Merrill, Deference]; Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Textualism 
and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 351, 351 (1994) [hereinafter 
Merrill, Textualism] (concluding that Justice Thomas appears to share same views about 
textualist interpretation as Justice Scalia). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New 
Textualism, 37 UCLAL. REv. 621 (1990) (describing Justice Scalia's approach to statutory 
interpretation as "new textualism"). 
24. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 
1176 (1989). But see EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 232-33 (criticizing Scalia's argument that 
textualism imposes more reliable restraints on judicial discretion). 
25. See SUNSTElN, supra note 18, at 113 (describing textualist view that "the statutory 
language is the only legitimate basis for interpretation"); id. at 113-17 (criticizing textualist 
statutory interpretation); see also EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 34-47, 232-33 & passim 
(describing and criticizing textualism); Dwyer, supra note 13, at 298-99; Eskridge & 
Frickey, supra note 12, at 327; Watson, supra note 12, at 212-13. 
26. Justice Scalia believes that the constitutionally mandated role of the federal courts 
is to interpret the actual statutory text approved by both chambers of Congress and presented 
to the President and, therefore, that courts should not look at legislative history written 
by committees or individual members of Congress. See, e.g., West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. 
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textualists argue that judges should focus on the statutory text itself, which 
they should read in light of the statute's structure, the canons of statutory 
construction, administrative nonns underlying the statute's implementation, 
comparisons with the accepted interpretations of comparable statutory 
provisions, and the dictionary meanings most congruous with ordinary 
English usage and applicable law. 27 Many textualists believe that if a 
statute's text has a plain meaning, it is unnecessary or improper for judges 
to examine either its legislative history or the legislature's implicit purposes 
in enacting the measure. 28 
Justice Scalia and other new textualists often recognize that the mean-
ing of words depends upon their context,29 but they seek whenever possible 
v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power 
Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 585, 586 (1994); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and 
the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 
76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1300-01 (1990) (discussing textualist argument that Presentment 
Clause of Constitution requires judges to look at statutory text only); if. INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919, 925-32 (1983) (fmding one-house legislative veto violates requirements 
of bicameralism and presentment set forth in Article I). But see EsKRIDGE, supra note 
12, at 230-32 (criticizing Scalia's bicameralism and presentment arguments); Arthur Stock, 
Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How 
Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160, 190-92 (criticizing Justice Scalia for not 
considering legislative history). Although Justice Scalia's academic writings consistently 
take the position that it is improper for judges to consider legislative history, at times his 
judicial opinions have been willing to consider the intent of Congress in enacting a text. See 
Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REv. 585, 604 n.66 
(1996). 
27. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (arguing that judges should glean statutory meaning from interpretation 
"(1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage ... and (2) most compatible with the 
surrounding body oflaw into which the provision must be integrated"); Spence, supra note 
26, at 587. 
28. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(arguing that if statutory text has "plain meaning" it is unnecessary to examine statute's 
legislative history); United States v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) 
(providing classic statement of plain meaning rule); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Mean-
ing ": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PuB. 
POL'y 401, 433-39 (1994) (arguing that Justice Scalia frequently uses plain meaning rule 
to exclude use of legislative history); Watson, supra note 12, at 213 n.53 (same). But see 
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) (stating that 
courts may consult extrinsic materials such as legislative history even if statute's text has 
clear meaning after "superficial examination"). 
29. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(stating that "fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) 
is that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from 
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to use canons of construction or other interpretive principles to provide 
a fixed, "objective" meaning.30 Although Scalia recognizes that Con-
gress does not always write clear statutes, he contends that a textualist 
approach to statutory construction, including the adoption of clear interpre-
tive rules, will lead Congress to be more diligent and precise in drafting 
statutes.31 Proponents of a plain meaning canon argue that Congress should 
write a statute so that the average English speaker could understand its 
meaning. 32 
Textualists are usually less policy oriented than most proponents of 
purposivism, modified intentional ism, or dynamic statutory interpretation. 
If the text requires unpalatable results, a judge should normally enforce the 
textual commands and leave it to Congress to fix any mistakes. 33 Some 
textualists might refuse to enforce a text's commands if doing so would 
produce absurd results,34 but they would be less likely to substitute alterna-
tive language for flawed statutory language because only Congress may 
enact corrective legislation.3s 
Even critics of textualism acknowledge "that the statutory text is the 
most authoritative interpretive criterion. ,,36 To some extent, the revival of 
the context in which'it is used"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in 
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 61, 61 (1994); Merrill, Textualism, 
supra note 23, at 352. 
30. See Karkkainen, supra note 28, at 403-04, 428-30, 445-49 (discussing and 
criticizing Justice Scalia's use of grammatical and structural canons to resolve apparent 
ambiguities in statutory language); Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 352 (explaining 
that new textuaIists seek objective method to determine how ordinary reader of statute would 
have understood statute's words at time of enactment). 
31. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia, J.). But see 
EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 230-32 (criticizing Scalia's "democracy enhancing" argument). 
32. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Func-
tion of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 231, 250 (stating that plain meaning approach 
enables Schauer to "converse with an English speaker with whom I have nothing in common 
but our shared language"). 
33. See Carolyn McNiven, Comment, Using Severability Clauses to Solve the Attain-
ment Dilemma in Environmental Statutes, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1255, 1302 (1992). 
34. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324 n.2 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t is a venerable principle that a law will not 
be interpreted to produce absurd results. "). 
35. See McNiven, supra note 33, at 1302. But see EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 134 
("[B]y allowing an 'absurd result' exception to his dogmatic textualism, Scalia allowed for 
just as much indeterminacy, and just as much room for judicial play, as he accused Brennan 
of creating with his context-dependent approach to statutory meaning. "). 
36. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 354; see also Frickey, supra note 15, at 408 
n.1l9 (observing that while many judges are not textualists, all judges are "presumptive 
HeinOnline -- 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1240 1996
1240 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231 (1996) 
textualism during the 1980s was a healthy reaction to the misuse of legisla-
tive history by many judges. 37 Nevertheless, a majority of the Supreme 
Court has remained open to nontextualist interpretation. 38 
Numerous commentators have attacked the textuaIist approach to statu-
tory construction and argued that judges should examine extrinsic sources, 
such as legislative history, as a means to reconstruct congressional intent in 
enacting a statutory provision, especially if the textual terms are ambiguous. 39 
In many cases, statutes do not have a single meaning based on dictionary 
defInitions or ordinary English usage. 4O In addition, changes in social cir-
cumstances may make it impractical or unwise to implement a statute pre-
textualists II who "follow relatively clear statutory language absent some strong reason to 
deviate from it"); Watson, supra note 12, at 243 n.191. 
37. See ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1583 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., dissenting) 
("We in the jUdiciary have become shamelessly profligate and unthinking in our use of 
legislative history .... "); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextual-
ism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. 
L. REv. 749, 751 (1995) (arguing that revival oftextualism during 1980s was to some extent 
healthy development counteracting improper use of legislative history); Patricia M. Wald, 
Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 
IOWA L. REv. 195, 197, 214 (1983) (discussing ability of judges to use selective portions 
of legislative history). See generally Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, Use of Legislative 
Histories by the United States Supreme Court: A Statistical Analysis, 9 J. LEGIS. 282 (1982) 
(presenting statistical study showing Supreme Court increasingly used legislative history 
from 1938 to 1979 and that increase in usage was especially rapid after 1970). 
38. See, e.g., West Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that lithe Court uses the implements of literalism to 
wound, rather than to minister to, congressional intent"); id. at 112-16 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Congress is more likely to override textualist interpretations of 
statutes and that majority'S textualist interpretation is less consistent with Congress's intent 
than dissent's less verbatim reading); see also Karkkainen, supra note 28, at 401 ("Only 
Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas can be called adherents of Justice Scalia's 
plain meaning approach. "). 
39. See Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 
386; Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing 
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 
309 (1990). 
40. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 38-47 (criticizing textualist approaches to 
statutory interpretation on grounds that in difficult cases there are always textual ambigu-
ities); LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 113-17 (1993) (showing how 
ineptly judges use statutory language to defme meaning of statute and criticizing Justice 
Scalia in particular); Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. 
u. L.Q. 1057, 1064-65 (1995) (arguing that English language alone cannot supply defmitive 
meaning). See generally Clark D. Cunningham et aI., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 
YALE L.J. 1561 (1994) (arguing that words often have multiple meanings and therefore 
attempts to defme single plain language interpretation are flawed). 
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cisely as Congress wrote it.41 Furthermore, although a textualist approach 
is supposed to increase the fidelity of courts to congressional intent, textualist 
statutory interpretation may actually decrease legislative power by reading 
the plain language of a statute too narrowly in a way that thwarts the intent 
of most members of Congress. 42 Although Congress overrides only a small 
number of judicial decisions each year, there is some empirical evidence to 
support Justice Stevens's view that textualist decisions by the Supreme Court 
are disproportionately rejected by Congress. 43 
III. Chevron and Textualism 
Although most discussions of statutory interpretation focus on the role 
of the judiciary, an executive agency is almost always the initial interpreter 
of an environmental statute. Usually, the crucial question is whether a court 
should accept the agency's interpretation. The Supreme Court's Chevron 
decision emphasized judicial deference to agency interpretations. Textualists, 
however, tend to be less deferential to agency interpretations, especially 
those interpretations that broadly construe the authority of environmental 
agencies to regulate private property. 
A. The Chevron Decision 
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 44 which fundamen-
tally changed the law regarding when a court should defer to an agency's 
construction of a statute. 45 During the beginning of the Reagan administra-
41. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 125-28 (discussing hypothetical involving 
directive to "fetch five pounds of soup meat every Monday" and using hypothetical to 
illustrate need to consider changed circumstances). 
42. See, e.g., West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the Court uses the implements of literalism to 
wound, rather than to minister to, congressional intent"); id. at 112-16 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that Congress is more likely to override textualist interpretations of statutes 
and that majority's textualist interpretation is less consistent with Congress's intent than 
dissent's less verbatim reading); Michael Hen, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional 
Micromanagement: A Potential Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARv. ENVTL. 
L. REv. 175,204 (1992); Spence, supra note 26, at 588 & passim; Stock, supra note 26. 
43. See infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text. 
44. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
45. See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty 
Years of Law and Politics, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 249,286-92 
(arguing that although Court may not have intended to do so, Chevron revolutionized issue 
of when courts defer to agencies); Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 975-76 (same); 
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tion, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reversed a policy adopted 
during the Carter administration and issued a revised rule interpreting the 
term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act to allow operators of polluting 
facilities to treat all emitting devices as if they were under a single 
"bubble. "46 The Supreme Court chastised the court of appeals for failing to 
defer to the EPA's interpretation of the statute despite the fact that the EPA's 
definition of stationary source arguably represented a "sharp break with prior 
interpretations of the Act. ,,47 
Chevron established a two-part test for determining when courts should 
defer to an agency's construction of a statute. First, a court must examine 
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. "48 
If Congress has so spoken to the issue, then the court must effectuate that 
intent regardless of the agency's interpretation. 49 If the statute is ambiguous, 
however, the court in the second level of analysis must defer to the agency's 
interpretation if it is "permissible," or in other words, if it is reasonable. 50 
The Supreme Court in Chevron concluded that courts ought to defer to 
reasonable agency interpretations of silent or ambiguous statutes if Congress 
has expressly or implicitly delegated policymaking or law-interpreting power 
to the agency. 51 The Court did not provide a clear explanation or formula 
Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing 
Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REv. 83, 94-99 (1994) (same); Kenneth w. 
Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283,284 (1986) (same). 
46. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837,840 (1984) (stating that revised rule allowed "bubbles" even if source was located in 
area that did not attain national ambient air quality standards). 
47. Id. at 862; see Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 977; Antonin Scalia, Judicial 
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (noting that 
under Chevron, "there is no longer any justification for giving 'special' deference to 'long-
standing and consistent' agency interpretations of law"). 
48. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
49. See id. at 843 n.9 ("The judiciary is the fmal authority on issues of statutory con-
struction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressio-
nal inten~. "). 
50. See id. at 840, 84345; Starr, supra note 45, at 288 (noting that Chevron's inquiry 
whether agency interpretation is "permissible" is equivalent to whether agency action is 
reasonable); Keith Werhan, Delegalizing Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 423, 457 
(same). 
51. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84344. If a court finds "an express delegation of 
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation," the 
court must accept the regulation unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary 
to the statute." Id. On the other hand, if the legislative delegation is "implicit rather than 
explicit," the "court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Id. at 844; see also 
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for what constitutes an implicit delegation, but the close of Justice Stevens's 
opinion suggested that a gap in congressional intent or statutory language 
might be enough in some cases to create such an implicit delegation. 52 
Justice Stevens suggested that agencies are usually better equipped than 
judges at filling in gaps in complex statutory schemes because agencies are 
closer to the political branches and possess greater expertise. The Court 
observed that "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer" 
and further stated that "an agency to which Congress has delegated 
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that discretion, 
properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to 
inform its judgments. "53 The Chevron Court also mentioned the EPA's 
expertise as a reason for deference. 54 
B. The Chevron Era of Judicial Deference? 
Many commentators initially believed that the Chevron decision was 
revolutionary and established a new framework for administrative law.55 
Before Chevron, courts were inconsistent about the degree of deference due 
to administrative statutory interpretations,56 but some decisions stated that 
there was a presumption that courts ought to exercise independent judgment 
Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 25 (1990) (discussing Chevron's distinction between explicit and 
implicit delegations). 
52. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; Anthony, supra note 51, at 32-35 (discussing 
what constitutes implicit delegation under Chevron). 
53. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 865. 
54. See itI. at 865; Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 977 n.39. 
55. See MerriII, Deference, supra note 23, at 969-70 ("Indeed, read for all it is worth, 
the decision would make administrative actors the primary interpreters of federal statutes 
and relegate courts to the largely inert role of enforcing unambiguous statutory terms. "); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2075 
(1990) ("[Chevron] has become a kind of Marbury, or counter-Marbury, for the administra-
tive state. "); Panel Discussion, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative 
Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 353, 367 (1987) (documenting Professor Sunstein's discussion that 
contrasted "strong" versus "weak" readings of Chevron). 
56. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.4, 
at 34849 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that prior to Chevron decision in 1984, "the Supreme Court 
maintained two inconsistent lines of cases that purported to instruct courts concerning the 
proper judicial role in reviewing agency interpretations of agency-administered statutes"); 
Seidenfeld, supra note 45, at 93-94 (suggesting that before Chevron, courts were inconsis-
tent about amount of deference they paid to agency statutory interpretations; some courts 
were quite deferential, others paid little heed to agency interpretations). 
HeinOnline -- 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1244 1996
1244 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231 (1996) 
about the meaning of statutes, and those decisions also stated that deference 
to executive interpretations required special reasons. 57 After Chevron, a 
court apparently may exercise independent judgment only if Congress has 
spoken to the precise question at hand, and deference to executive interpreta-
tions of statutes appears to be the norm. 58 Chevron justified this shift in 
presumptions by invoking democratic theory. 59 Judges "are not part of either 
political branch," and they "have no constituency." 60 On the other hand, 
although agencies are "not directly accountable to the people," they are 
subject to the general oversight and supervision of the President, who is a 
nationally elected public official.61 In addition, Chevron appeared to presume 
that whenever Congress delegated authority to administer a statute, it also 
delegated authority to the agency to fIll in any gaps present in the statute, 
rather than leaving that role to the judiciary. 62 Thus, although the traditional 
approach to administrative law viewed the interpretation of ambiguous 
statutes as a question of law, 63 Chevron transformed such interpretations into 
a question of an agency "policy choice. "64 
Commentators disagreed about the extent to which Chevron required 
judicial deference to an agency's statutory interpretations. 65 Commentators 
57. See Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 977. See generally Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. l34 (1944) (establishing doctrine of cautious deference with regard to 
agency statutory interpretations). 
58. See Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 977. 
59. See id. at 978; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing 
an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1239 n.l (1989) (claiming that 
Chevron provides best example of Supreme Court's increasing willingness to construct 
public law doctrines designed to maximize power of people to control their agents). But see 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 290 (arguing that Chevron wrongly relies upon democratic 
theory to justify judicial deference to agencies; instead, courts should try to enforce intent 
of Congress, "whose members are elected by and accountable directly to the people"). 
60. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66. 
61. See id.; Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 978 n.44 ("Chevron's democratic 
theory thesis appears to presuppose a unitary executive, i.e., an interpretation of separation 
of powers that would place all entities engaged in the execution of the law - including the 
so-called independent regulatory agencies - under Presidential control. H). 
62. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (finding that Congress sometimes implicitly 
delegates to agency authority to fill gap in statute); Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 
979 (" Chevron in effect adopted a fiction that assimilated all cases involving statutory 
ambiguities or gaps into the express delegation or 'legislative rule' model. to); Scalia, supra 
note 47, at 516-17 (suggesting that Chevron presumes that ambiguities entail delegation of 
interpretative power). 
63. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994); Werhan, supra note 50, at 457. 
64. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45; Werhan, supra note 50, at 457. 
65. Compare EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 162-63 ("Stevens's opinion in Chevron is 
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have debated about whether Chevron announces a new paradigm in adminis-
trative law in which agencies would have the leading role in interpreting 
statutes and formulating policy with limited judicial supervision, 66 or whether 
Chevron merely establishes voluntary or flexible prudential limitations. 67 
C. Empirical Evidence 
Although many commentators initially assumed that Chevron would 
substantially increase the likelihood that courts would affIrm agency deci-
sions,68 signifIcant evidence reveals that the rate of affIrmance of agencies in 
the Supreme COurt69 and circuit courts 70 is approximately the same or even 
a legal process exemplar .... Chevron delivers the punch line for Hart and Sack's purpose-
oriented approach to statutory interpretation: especially in complicated technical regulatory 
statutes, Congress cannot anticipate most problems of application. "), with SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 18, at 143, 224 (arguing that Chevron undermines traditional role of courts as ultimate 
interpreter of statutes and allows agencies too much discretion to defme scope of their own 
authority). 
66. See Seidenfeld, supra note 45, at 96-97 (arguing that strong reading of Chevron 
"essentially transfers the primary responsibility for interpreting regulatory statutes from the 
courts to the agency authorized to administer the statute "). See generally Cynthia R. Farina, 
Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. 
L. REv. 452 (1989) (asserting that Chevron implicitly redefines separation of powers); 
Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. LJ. 269 (1988) (arguing that Chevron is logical corol-
lary to courts' acceptance of extremely hberal delegations of authority to executive agencies 
despite nondelegation doctrine). 
67. See Seidenfeld, supra note 45, at 94-99 (stating that while courts have disagreed 
to some extent about how to read Chevron, most "lower courts have applied its dictates with 
unusual consistency and often with an almost alarming rigor"). See generally Maureen B. 
Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?: A New Doc-
trinal Basisfor Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 
1275 (arguing that Chevron is best interpreted as voluntary, prudential limitation on Supreme 
Court's review of agencies and, therefore, should be applied flexibly, on case-by-case basis); 
Sunstein, supra note 55 (arguing that Chevron should be re-interpreted so that reviewing 
court may reject reasonable agency interpretations if court believes agency interpretation is 
wrong). 
68. See supra notes 45, 55, and accompanying text. 
69. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Forward: Law as Equilibrium, 
108 HARv. L. REv. 26, 72 (1994) (stating that Supreme Court affirmed only 62 % of agency 
civil cases in 1993 term); Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 984 (stating that Supreme 
Court affirmed agency decisions about 70% of time for five years following Chevron as 
compared to 75% for three years prior to that case). 
70. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 65, 103 (concluding that affirmance rate in federal 
appellate courts dropped from mid-70% range in 1983-1987 to mid-60% range in 1988-
1990); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study 
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lower than before Chevron was decided in 1984.71 Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court itself has continued to apply the Chevron framework in only 
about one-third of the cases presenting a deference question. 72 As a result 
of this empirical evidence, a growing number of commentators have ques-
tioned whether Chevron has resulted in a significant increase in judicial 
deference to agency interpretations.73 Even some lower court decisions have 
cast doubt on whether judges consistently employ Chevron.74 Some commen-
tators argue that Chevron has not produced greater judicial deference to 
of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1038 (fmding that rate of affirmance 
in federal appellate courts was 75.5% three years after Chevron as compared to 70.9% for 
year preceding decision and concluding that Chevron significantly reduced rate at which 
federal courts of appeals remanded cases based upon rejection of administrative agency's 
interpretation of own statutes; however, effect had weakened somewhat by 1988). 
71. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy 
in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1070-71 (1995); 
supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. There are significant limitations in all evidence 
about the impact of Chevron because scholars disagree about how to measure when courts 
affirm agency decisions, and there is the fundamental problem of comparing apples to 
oranges because post-Chevron decisions do not necessarily pose the same issues as those 
decided in Chevron. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 70, at 91-92 ("Although Merrill's 
data were suggestive, they did not support his conclusions. Because the cases reviewed by 
the Supreme Court change over time, the overall Supreme Court uphold rates reveal little 
about changes in the Court's preferences for agency discretion and judicial deference. H). 
72. See Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 982; see also Merrill, Textualism, supra 
note 23, at 361-62 ('!-rguing that Supreme Court largely ignored Chevron framework during 
1992 term); Shapiro & Levy, supra note 71, at 1071 (citing Merrill's work). But see Cohen 
& Spitzer, supra note 70, at 91-92 (questioning Merrill's data). 
73. See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The Unproven Case of 
Increased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 658 n.123, 657-60 
(1996) (citing sources); Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 361-62 (fmding that Chevron 
appeared to be playing "an increasingly peripheral role in the decisions" of Supreme Court 
during its 1991 and 1992 terms and that Chevron was employed as "just another pair of 
pliers in the statutory interpretation tool chest"). But see Pierce, supra note 37, at 749-50 
("The Chevron test has largely realized its potential at the circuit court level. Appellate 
courts routinely accord deference to agency constructions of ambiguous language in agency-
administered statutes. "); Seidenfeld, supra note 45, at 84 n.5 ("Although [Merrill's Defer-
ence article, supra note 23] has led some commentators to question whether Chevron 
represents the r~volution in administrative law that many have proclaimed, the lower courts' 
consistent application probably has a greater day-to-day impact on the administrative 
operation of the state." (citation omitted». 
74. See Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 299 n.34 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(observing that "Chevron is not quite the 'agency deference' case that it is commonly 
thought to be by many of its supporters (and detractors)"); Ohio State Univ. v. Secretary, 
United States Dep't ot-Health & Human Servs., 996 F.2d 122, 123-24 n.l (6th Cir. 1993); 
Combee v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 248, 257-58 n.22 (1993) (Steinberg, J., dissenting); Caron, 
supra note 73, at 659-60. 
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agency determinations because the decision's framework is inherently inde-
terminate and manipulable. 7s As a result, judges can use Chevron to justify 
decisions based on their ideological preferences. 76 
If courts, including the Supreme Court itself, have not always followed 
the deferential approach seemingly set forth in Chevron, it is important to 
understand why and when courts are unlikely to be deferential. One impor-
tant answer is that courts are concerned with fairness in individual cases. 
Whatever the Supreme Court might announce as its test for judicial deference 
to an agency's permissible interpretation of ambiguous statutes, lower court 
judges are unlikely to defer to an agency interpretation of a statute that they 
strongly believe is wrong. 77 Although a judge's perception of fairness is 
undoubtedly important in determining the outcome in an individual case, that 
factor alone does not appear to be enough to explain the unexpectedly limited 
impact of the Chevron decision. 
Some commentators argue that a conservative Supreme Court in Chev-
ron sought to force more liberal lower court judges to defer to the conserva-
tive Reagan agenda; however, during the Bush presidency, the Court encour-
aged an increasingly conservative judiciary, dominated by Reagan and Nixon 
appointees, to reverse politically moderate agency policies. 78 In 1992, the 
election of President Clinton, a Democrat, increased the incentive for conser-
vative judges to transfer power from agencies to courts. 79 During the late 
1980s and early 1990s, it is notable that the Supreme Court increasingly used 
a textualist approach to statutory interpretation to justify such a shift in 
power from agencies to courts. 80 Undoubtedly, textualist judges like Justice 
75. See Caron, supra note 73, at 658-59; Shapiro & Levy, supra note 71, at 1069-72. 
76. See Caron, supra note 73, at 659; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Legislative Reform of 
Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1110, 1110-11 (1995); Shapiro & Levy, 
supra note 71, at 1071-72; see also Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1333 n.179 ("[TJhe effect of 
Chevron may have been more in the area of judicial rhetoric than actual judicial 
decisionmaking. H). 
77. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. 
REv. 363, 379-81 (1986). 
78. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 70, at 68 & passim; see also Pierce, supra note 
37, at 779-80 (discussing Cohen's and Spitzer's hypothesis). 
79. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 70, at 108-09 (predicting that conservative 
Supreme Court Justices would tend to affirm decisions that give less deference to administra-
tive agencies); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 69, at 76 (discussing how 1993 Supreme 
Court term provides "some evidence" to support Cohen's and Spitzer's prediction); Pierce, 
supra note 37, at 780 (discussing Cohen's and Spitzer's prediction about judicial review of 
Clinton administration decisions). 
80. See Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 970 & passim; Merrill, Textualism, 
supra note 23, at 353-55, 372-73; Pierce, supra note 37, at 750-52; infra notes 92-93 and 
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Scalia are motivated by more than purely political considerations, and their 
commitment to textualist theory sometimes leads them to results at odds with 
their political philosophies - but at least during the past several years, 
textualist statutory interpretation has often served to weaken the powers of 
administrative agencies. 81 
D. Textualism and Chevron 
The Chevron framework raises questions about how courts should 
interpret statutes and when courts should defer to an agency's initial read4tg 
of the relevant statute.82 Since the late 1980s, the Supreme Court has 
increasingly applied Chevron in light of a textualist approach to its reviewing 
role83 and has often used textualism to reject agency statutory interpreta-
tions.84 In theory, a textualist approach can result in either greater or less 
deference to agency views, depending on whether the court fmds that the text 
is clear or ambiguous. 8S In practice, however, most textualist judges are 
inclined to believe that they can fmd the proper interpretation of a statute in 
its text without any assistance from an administrative agency. 86 Judges 
accompanying text. 
81. See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text. 
82. Anthony, supra note 51, at 18-25 (finding that court's approach to statutory 
interpretation affects how it applies Chevron test); Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 990 
(same); Pierce, supra note 37, at 750-52, 777-79 & passim (same); Seidenfeld, supra note 
45, at 95-96 (observing that judges are much more likely to reverse agency interpretation 
at Chevron's first step than its second, but proposing more stringent "reasonableness" review 
at second step). 
83. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417-
18 (1992) (Kennedy, J.) ("If the agency interpretation is not in conflict with the plain lan-
guage of the statute, deference is due. In ascertaining whether the agency's interpretation 
is a permissible construction of the language, a court must look to the structure and language 
of the statute as a whole. If the text is ambiguous and so open to interpretation in some 
respects, a degree of deference is granted to the agency, though a reviewing court need not 
accept an interpretation which is unreasonable.") (citations omitted); Werhan, supra note 50, 
at 459 . 
84. See Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 970 & passim; Merrill, Textualism, 
supra note 23, at 353-55,372-73; Pierce, supra note 37, at 750-52. 
85. Compare Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 991 (arguing textualism undermines 
Chevron framework by making judges less deferential to agency statutory interpretations), 
and Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 353-54 (same), with Werhan, supra note 50, at 
459-60 ("The textualist understanding of Chevron review, however, is consistent with the 
delegalization impulse of the decision. "). 
86. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259-61 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (rejecting agency interpretation of statute as not reasonable); INS v. Cardoza-
Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Herz, supra 
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applying a textualist approach to statutory construction often believe they can 
usually find the proper meaning of statutes through judge-made canons of 
construction. 87 Judges applying a textualist approach may believe that 
questions of interpretation are like solving a puzzle and that they are clever 
enough to solve most of these puzzles without help from an agency. 88 
In principle, most proponents of textualism are inclined to defer to an 
agency's statutory interpretation because they usually prefer that judges not 
overrule policies made by the executive branch.89 Justice Scalia, however, 
is more likely to defer to an agency interpretation that construes a statute 
narrowly and to fmd that a broad agency interpretation conflicts with the 
statute's plain meaning and, therefore, is not entitled to Chevron deference. 90 
A partial explanation of this tendency may stem from Justice Scalia's view 
that a regulated fIrm claiming an injury from a regulation that exceeds an 
agency's statutory authority is more likely to meet standing criteria than an 
environmental group complaining that its individual members are being 
harmed by an agency's underenforcement of a statutory mandate. 91 
note 42, at 198-99; Karkkainen, supra note 28, at 460; Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, 
at 980-85 (noting that Supreme Court's use of textualist approach to statutory interpretation 
resulted in less Chevron deference during 1988-1990 terms); Merrill, Textualism, supra note 
23, at 355-63 (noting that Supreme Court's use of textualist approach to statutory interpreta-
tion resulted in less Chevron deference during 1992 term); Pierce, supra note 37, at 754-63 
(arguing that Supreme Court during 1993-1994 term applied "hypertextnalist" approach that 
led to insufficient application of Chevron deference principle). 
87. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 353, 372; Scalia, supra note 47, at 521; 
supra notes 27,30, and accompanying text; infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text. 
88. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 372; Pierce, supra note 37, at 779. On 
the other hand, critics of textuaIism have argued that judges are often inept at understanding 
the meaning of words. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 134 (arguing textualism sometimes 
reduces statutory interpretation "to a linguistic shell game played by amateurs"); Solan, 
supra note 40, at 113-17 (showing how ineptly judges use statutory language to define 
meaning of statute and criticizing Justice Scalia in particular). 
89. See Herz, supra note 42, at 198-99. 
90. See Karkkainen, supra note 28, at 461. 
91. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-68 (1992) (Scalia, J.) 
(holding that environmental group whose members only occasionally view endangered spe-
cies in foreign countries cannot show concrete "injury in fact" and, therefore, lack standing 
to challenge agency action under Endangered Species Act); Karkkainen, supra note 28, at 
462-64; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE 
LJ. 1141, 1167-68 (1993) (contending that Justice Scalia's approach to standing "threatens 
to constitutionaIize an unbalanced scheme of regulatory review" in which "courts can protect 
the interests of regulated entities" while "'regulatory beneficiaries' are left to the political 
process"). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 
"Injuries, n and Article m, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992) (arguing Justice Scalia's approach 
to standing in Lujan favors private economic interests and disfavors mere "beneficiaries" of 
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There is evidence that the rise of Justice Scalia's textualist approach to 
statutory interpretation coincided with a decline in the Court's willingness to 
apply the Chevron deference model. During the 1988, 1989, and 1990 
terms, just as Justice Scalia's textualist approach began to influence the Court 
strongly, the Supreme Court was less likely to defer to agency statutory 
constructions than it had been during the 1985 and 1986 terms.92 From 1990 
to 1994, the Supreme Court often used a textualist approach to find that a 
statute had a plain meaning and, therefore, that an agency's interpretation of 
the statute was not entitled to Chevron deference. 93 
IV. "Why Textualists Miss the Policy Dilemmas of Environmental Law 
This Part provides counterexamples that show it is not clear that a 
textualist approach will necessarily lead to more victories for environmental 
plaintiffs. Additionally, Part IV makes the broader argument that textualist 
judges often disregard the delicate policy balances struck by agencies be-
tween cost and safety. Part IV.A shows that Congress often enacts environ-
mental statutes with broad aspirational goals,94 but also frequently includes 
exemptions contained in the text's implementing provisions. Textualism does 
not provide the best method to resolve the conflict in environmental statutes 
between aspirational and limiting language. Rather, environmental agencies 
are better suited to strike this balance. Part IV.B explains how a textualist 
approach can be used to thwart environmental goals by reading the authority 
of environmental agencies narrowly. Part IV.C illustrates why the textualist 
method is sufficiently indeterminate that a textualist judge can decide many 
cases either for or against environmental advocacy groups and maintains that 
agencies are better situated to strike a balance among competing statutory 
goals. 
public interest statutes). 
92. See Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 990-93. But see Cohen & Spitzer, supra 
note 70, at 91-92 ("Although Merrill's data were suggestive, they did not support his 
conclusions. Because the cases reviewed by the Supreme Court change over time, the 
overall Supreme Court uphold rates reveal little about changes in the Court's preferences 
for agency discretion and judicial deference. "). 
93. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 355-63, 372-73 & passim (noting that 
Supreme Court's use of textualist approach to statutory interpretation resulted in less 
Chevron deference during 1992 term); Pierce, supra note 37, at 750-52, 762-63 & passim 
(arguing that Supreme Court during 1993-1994 term applied hypertextualist approach that 
led to insufficient application of Chevron deference principle). 
94. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 236-50 (analyzing aspirationallanguage in Section 
112 of Clean Air Act); Henderson & Pearson, supra note 6, at 1429-70 (discussing frequent 
use of aspirational language in environmental statutes and problems often caused by such 
language). 
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A. The Nature of Environmental Statutes 
Congress often enacts environmental statutes by overwhelming majori-
ties and with ambitious goals,95 but placates economic interests by placing 
more restrictive language or exceptions in the legislation's implementing 
provisions or legislative history.96 Congress frequently passes environmental 
bills during periods of broad public enthusiasm, so-called "republican mo-
ments. ,,97 Since the late 1960s, public support for environmentalism has 
varied somewhat, but has remained relatively strong. 98 Environmental 
advocacy groups have enjoyed a fair amount of success at influencing legisla-
tion. 99 Yet, most of the political controversy surrounding the enactment of 
environmental law stems from the redistributive impact of such statutes, 
95. Most major federal environmental statutes begin with a statement of congressional 
findings about why the measure is needed or a declaration of its rationales, purposes, or 
goals. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994); Endangered 
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994); Solid 
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6902 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 
(1994); Watson, supra note 12, at 202 n.lO (citing additional statutes). Neither the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994), nor the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, contain a 
statement of findings or purpose. Watson, supra note 12, at 202 n.lO. 
96. See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of 
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. LJ. 2407, 2427 
(1995); Watson, supra note 12, at 250-51. 
97. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 59, 66-67 (1992) (arguing that passage of many environmental statutes can be 
attributed to "republican moments" of popular enthusiasm rather than to interest group 
pOlitics or actions of political elites); Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide 
Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON 
REG. 369, 418-19, 422-27 (1993) (discussing "republican moment" explanation of pesticide 
regulation). 
98. See Farber, supra note 97, at 74-75. See generally Riley E. Dunlap, Public Opin-
ion and Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY 63-114 (James 
P. Lester ed., 2d ed. 1995) (discussing public opinion data on public support for environ-
mental programs). But see Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementa-
tion of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 314, 
34245 (arguing that there is persistent public schizophrenia between public aspirations for 
environmental quality and public's unwillingness to take steps necessary to achieve such 
quality). 
99. See Farber, supra note 97, at 60 ("Environmental groups manage to organize quite 
effectively. H); id. at 70-72 (stating that environmental groups play important role in legisla-
tive process by providing credible information that politicians can use); id. at 73-75 
(discussing formation and growth of environmental groups); see also Helen M. Ingram et 
aI., Interest Groups and Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLmCs AND POLICY, 
supra note 98, at 11545. 
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which create winners and losers among various industries and individual 
finns within a particular industry. 100 This subpart will focus on compromise 
language found in an environmental statute's text, and Part V will address 
such limitations in its legislative history. 
Because environmental statutes often contain subtle political' compro-
mises buried amidst bold aspirational language, courts must be sensitive to 
the restrictive implementation provisions in the text and to the views of the 
environmental agency in charge of implementing the statute. For instance, 
in the purposes section of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean 
Water Act), Congress declares that "[t]he objective of this chapter is to 
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters. "101 Some courts have relied on this purposes section to 
construe other provisions of the Clean Water Act. 102 For example, in 
National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch,103 the district court relied on this 
broad aspirationallanguage in interpreting other sections of the Act, declar-
ing that Congress intended the statute's permit program to be comprehensive 
and to cover any situation encompassed by the statutory language, whether 
or not the particular application was contemplated by Congress at the time 
of enactment. 104 The term "discharge of a pollutant" is defmed as "any 
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source. "105 The 
district court held that any adverse dam-induced water quality changes 
constitute a "discharge of a pollutant" under the Act and ordered the EPA to 
designate dams as a point source category for permitting requirements; in so 
holding, the court rejected the agency's argument that many types of dams 
do not add pollutants to navigable waters because the pollutants involved are 
already in the reservoir water and, therefore, that dams are generally 
nonpoint sources of pollution subject to less stringent regulation. 106 The 
100. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional 
Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 792-96 (1993); Lazarus, supra 
note 96, at 2427. 
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). 
102. See Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (D. Colo. 
1993) ("[f]he Tenth Circuit has chosen to interpret the terminology of the Clean Water Act 
broadly to give full effect to Congress['s] declared goal and policy .... H); Watson, supra 
note 12, at 265 n.275 (citing cases in which courts relied on preambles of environmental law 
statutes); infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
103. 530 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1982). 
104. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 1304 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 
693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). 
106. See Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. at 1295-97, 1306-07, 1311-13. The EPA acknowl-
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district court refused to defer to the EPA's view that the dams were nonpoint 
sources because that interpretation "runs counter to expressed congressional 
intent" and was "[in]consistent with the purpose and policies of the Act. "107 
However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
reversed the lower court, concluding that the EPA's interpretation - which 
excluded certain varieties of dam-caused pollution from the Section 402 
pennit program - was reasonable, did not frustrate congressional intent, and 
was entitled to "great deference. "108 Judge Wald warned that it was danger-
ous for a court to rely on aspirational language in an environmental statute 
when construing the implementation language in another section of the statute 
because "it is one thing for Congress to announce a grand goal, and quite 
another for it to mandate full implementation." 109 The court of appeals 
observed that "[c]aution is always advisable in relying on a general declara-
tion of purpose to alter the apparent meaning of a specific provision" and, 
therefore, that "Congress's expressed goal to eliminate 'the discharge of 
pollutants' does not necessarily require that we expansively construe the term 
'pollutant,' which Congress itself specifically defmed." 110 The Clean Water 
Act contains numerous provisions mandating that cost be considered in 
establishing effluent limitations and various exemptions from such limitations 
that were all arguably inconsistent with at least the spirit of the purposes 
edged that nonpoint sources, including dams, are considered point sources when they emit 
pollutants from discernible, discrete conveyances. [d. at 1312. Conversely, Judge Green 
recognized that her order "will not force [the] EPA to require a permit for every dam in the 
United States." [d. at 1313. She pointed out that "[m]any dams may cause no pollution 
problems whatsoever, and there are administrative options available to EPA, such as 
categorical exemptions, areawide permits and general permits, which can minimize the 
burden on both the [a]gency and dam owners and operators." [d. 
107. [d. at 1311. 
108. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The 
EPA successfully argued that when water is aerated in excess of normal concentration, dam-
induced water quality changes involving low dissolved oxygen, cold, and supersaturation are 
not point source pollutants under Section 502(6) subject to the Section 402 permit program, 
but are nonpoint sources of pollution under Section 208. See id. at 161-66, 171-83; see also 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1342, 1362(6) (1994). 
109. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 178; see also United States v. Plaza Health Lab., Inc., 3 
F.3d 643, 647 (2d Cir. 1993) (recognizing that while "broad remedial purpose" of Clean 
Water Act is to restore and maintain integrity of Nation's waters, "[t]he narrow questions 
posed by this case, however, may not be resolved merely by simple reference to this 
admirable goal"); Watson, supra note 12, at 252 n.222 (same). But see Sierra Club v. 
Colorado Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (D. Colo. 1993) (noting that Tenth Cir-
cuit's broad interpretation gives full effect to Congress's goals); Watson, supra note 12, at 
265 n.275 (citing cases in which courts relied on preambles of environmental law statutes). 
110. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 178. 
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section of the Act.lIl Furthermore, "Congress hedged the purposes section 
by making it apply only as 'consistent with the provisions of this [Act]."'l12 
Judge Wald concluded that the EPA's interpretation did not plainly contradict 
the text of the Act, that the statute's legislative history was ambiguous, and 
"that the district court erred in relying on the legislative goals expressed in 
§ 101(a) to invalidate EPA's otherwise reasonable construction" of the 
statute. 113 
Professor Lazarus's and Ms. Newman's observation that the texts of 
environmental statutes often contain fewer pro-industry exemptions than their 
legislative histories may be correct, but even the texts of such statutes 
frequently include limiting language. 114 Accordingly, the fundamental 
problem with textualism is that its use by courts is likely to lead to a flawed 
approach when balancing aspirational and narrow economic language in a 
statute. When interpreting an environmental statute, courts and agencies 
must be sensitive to conflicts within the text between broad public goals 
(e.g., protecting human health and environmental quality) and qualifications 
that allow agencies to grant exemptions for industry when the costs of 
regulation exceed its benefits. liS Textualist courts applying traditional 
statutory canons (e.g., a specific provision overcomes a general provision) 116 
are unlikely to come to grips with the policy dimensions of achieving a 
workable balance between health and cost issues. In National Wildlife 
Federation v. Gorsuch, 117 the court of appeals appropriately deferred to the 
EPA's balancing of conflicting statutory language in addressing the specific 
problem of regulating dams, but a textualist judge might believe that she 
could read the text as well as the EPA. 
B. Textualism Can Be Used to Limit the Authority of 
Environmental Agencies 
Despite Professor Lazarus's and Ms. Newman's optimism about the 
beneficial results of textualist interpretation, judges applying a textualist 
111. See id. 
112. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)). 
113. Id. at 179-81. 
114. See supra notes 96, 109-11, and accompanying text. 
115. See McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. LJ. 705, 739-40 (1992) ("Most regulatory legislation contains 
conflicts between a broad, public-regarding, and unqualified mandate and implementing 
sections that introduce qualifications."); Watson, supra note 12, at 251 n.217. 
116. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 2~5-36 (listing statutory canons). 
117. 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
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approach have often given a constricted reading to the text of an environmen-
tal statute and thereby concluded that an agency lacked the authority to 
impose regulations on industry. For example, in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. 
United States,IIS the Court applied a textualist reading to the term "emission 
standard" and concluded that an emission standard is a numerical limit on the 
level of permissible emissions, as from a smokestack. 119 In addition, the 
Court held that the EPA did not have the authority to impose controls over 
work practices such as requiring that asbestos-containing materials be wetted 
down before a building is demolished to reduce the amount of asbestos 
escaping into the ambient air .120 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens 
criticized the majority for ignoring the EPA's contrary interpretation, impor-
tant legislative history, and the practical reasons for the EPA's policy. 121 
Adamo Wrecking was a pre-Chevron decision, but the same restrictive 
approach to statutory interpretation is still possible after Chevron if a court 
concludes that the plain meaning of a statute does not allow the EPA to 
engage in a particular type of regulation. 122 
For instance, Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion in PUD No.1 v. 
Washington Department of Ecology, 123 illustrates that a textualist approach to 
118. 434 U.S. 275 (1978). 
119. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285-89 (1978). 
120. See ill.; 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(b)(I)(B) (1970) (amended 1978) (current version at 
42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994)); Herz, supra note 42, at 185 n.58 (noting that Congress swiftly 
amended statute to reject Court's interpretation by enacting Pub. L. No. 95-623, § 13(b), 
92 Stat. 3443, 3458 (1978), and asserting that 1990 Amendments to Clean Air Act have 
drastically amended Section 112 of statute (citing Pub. L. No., 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat. 
2399 (1990), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994))). 
121. Adamo Wrecking Co., 434 U.S. at 294-307 (Stevens, J., dissenting); accord 1 
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 231, 345-47 (1986) 
(criticizing Adamo Wrecking Court for its narrow reading of statute, failure to consider 
relevant legislative history, and poor policy consequences of decision); Herz, supra note 42, 
at 185 n.60 (same). 
122. See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119-20 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(finding Section 211(k)(1) of Clean Air Act has "plain meaning" and that EPA had no 
authority to promulgate 30% renewable oxygenate requirement for its regulations for refor-
mulated gasoline to be used in nonattainment areas); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 
1058-62 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding "plain language" of Section 211(f)(4) of Clean Air Act 
allowed waivers based only on fuel additive's effect on emission standards and, therefore, 
EPA had no authority to consider health effects); Patricia M. Wald, Environmental Post-
cards From the Edge: The Year That Was and the Year That Might Be, 26 ENVTL L. REp. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10182, 10184-85 (April 1996) (noting that courts applying plain meaning 
approach to statutory construction often refuse to look at broad statutory goals or purposes 
and therefore frequently decline to presume delegation of congressional power to agency). 
123. 114 S. Ct. 1900, 1915-19 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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statutory interpretation will not always lead to favorable results for environ-
mentalists. 124 In PUD, the Supreme Court held that the Washington State 
Department of Ecology could condition certification of hydroelectric power 
plants on the applicant's meeting minimum stream flow rates that the Depart-
ment had imposed pursuant to Section 401 of the Clean Water Act.l25 Justice 
O'Connor's majority opinion concluded that the EPA's interpretation of 
Section 401, which authorized the Department's imposition of minimum 
stream flow requirements, was a "reasonable interpretation" of an ambiguous 
statute and, therefore, entitled to deference under Chevron. l26 Justice 
O'Connor also stated that "the literal terms of the statute" required such an 
interpretation. 127 
In dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that the 
majority had misinterpreted the statute by too broadly reading language in 
Section 401(d) allowing a state to impose "other limitations" beyond the 
effluent limitations required by Section 301 of the Act, and also argued that 
the Court's interpretation would allow states to impose virtually any condi-
tion on applicants for a permit under the Act. 128 Justice Thomas demon-
strated a palpable pro-development bias when he argued that stream flow 
levels established by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (PERC) 
ought to prevail over state-imposed levels because "[i]n issuing licenses, 
FERC must balance the Nation's power needs together with the need for 
energy conservation, irrigation, flood control, fish and wildlife protection, 
and recreation. State environmental agencies, by contrast, need only con-
sider parochial environmental interests." 129 
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued that "[flor judges 
who find it unnecessary to go behind the statutory text to discern the intent 
124. See PUD No.1 v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 114 S. Ct. .1900, 1915-19 (1994) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
125. See itt. at 1910-11; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)-(d) (1994); Debra L. Donahue, 
The Untapped Power o/Clean Water Act Section 401, 23 EcOLOGYL.Q. 201, 207-17 (1996) 
(discussing PUD). 
126. PUD, 114 S. Ct. at 1909. 
127. ld. at 1910; see Pierce, supra note 37, at 754 n.26. 
128. PUD, 114 S. Ct. at 1915-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
129. ld. at 1920 (first emphasis in original) (citation omitted). It is noteworthy that 
Justices Scalia and Thomas normally are favorably disposed to protecting the interests of 
State governments against federal intrusion except apparently in the case of state environ-
mental regulation. See generally Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 
(1996) (Justices Scalia and Thomas joining in majority holding that Congress lacks power 
under Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit 
in federal court and thereby to subject states to federal court jurisdiction in suits by Indian 
tribes under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act). 
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of Congress, this is (or should be) an easy case" both because nothing in the 
Act restricts the power of states to regulate the quality of their waters more 
stringently than federal law might require and because "the Act explicitly 
recognizes states' ability to impose stricter standards. "130 Even if textualism 
is in theory more favorable to environmental interests, a judge who is hostile 
to environmental values can easily manufacture a textualist argument for 
ruling against the environment. 
C. Textualist Interpretation Is Indeterminate 
This subpart examines two recent Supreme Court decisions, City of 
Chicago and Sweet Home, to demonstrate that the textualist method is 
sufficiently indeterminate that a textualist judge could have decided these two 
cases either for or against environmental advocacy groups. Although other 
methods of statutory interpretation may not provide a clearer answer to a 
statute's meaning, it is notable that textualists tend to be convinced about the 
trustworthiness of their methodology and are predisposed to deprecate the 
views of the implementing agency. 
1. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund 
a. Background 
Although City of Chicago provides the strongest evidence for the 
Lazarus-Newman thesis that textualist statutory interpretation is pro-environ-
mentalist, a textualist judge could have easily ruled the other way. In light 
of this indeterminacy, the Supreme Court ought to have given more weight 
to the EPA's interpretation. Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act "empowers" the EPA to establish a comprehensive "cradle to 
grave" system to regulate the generation, transport, storage, treatment, and 
disposal of hazardous wastes. 131 In 1980, the EPA exempted "household 
waste" from Subtitle C regulation because household waste usually contains 
only a very small percentage of hazardous waste materials, but the cost to 
municipalities of segregating that small amount for separate disposal would 
be extremely high. 132 However, municipalities wanted to expand the ash 
130. PUD, 114 S. Ct. at 1915 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
131. See City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1590 
(1994); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 337 n.l (1994) (defining 
hazardous waste and its regulation procedures); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6949 (1994) 
(including no specifications about which wastes are Subtitle C hazardous wastes and 
directing Administrator of EPA to develop criteria for "identifying the characteristics of 
hazardous waste" and for "listing hazardous waste"). 
132. See Hazardous Waste Management System: Identification and Listing of Hazardous 
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exemption to mixed household and other nonhazardous waste because collec-
tors often do not separate these types of waste and because large municipal 
resource recovery facilities need huge volumes of mixed waste to be econom-
ical. 133 
In 1984, Congress added a number of amendments to the statute, 
including Section 3001(i), which was entitled "Clarification of Household 
Waste Exclusion." 134 Section 3001(i) declared that a "resource recovery 
facility" burning "municipal solid waste" - which includes both household 
waste and nonhazardous waste from commercial and industrial sources -
"shall not be deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise 
managing hazardous wastes" under Subtitle C.135 In addition, a Senate report 
accompanying the 1984 amendment stated that "[a]ll waste management 
activities of such a facility, including the generation, transportation, treat-
ment, storage and disposal of waste shall be covered by the exclusion." 136 
The EPA initially appeared to take the view that ash from the burning of 
mixed household and nonhazardous waste could be hazardous waste, but 
after several years of taking conflicting positions in congressional testimony, 
the EPA fmally sided with the exemption position favored by municipal 
incinerators of mixed waste. 137 
Waste, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,104 (1980); City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1590-91. Beyond 
declaring that household waste is not hazardous waste, the 1980 regulations provided a "waste 
stream" exemption for household waste that exempted household wastes from generation 
through treatment (including incineration) to final disposal of residues (including ash). [d. at 
1591. Thus, an incinerator that burned only household waste was exempt from Subtitle C 
regulations for both hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities as weU as those 
regulations for generators of hazardous waste and was therefore free to dispose of its ash in 
a Subtitle D nonhazardous waste landfiU. [d.; Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 7. 
133. Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 8 .. The critical question apparently was 
whether the ash residue from such incinerated mixed waste was exempt from Subtitle C. The 
1980 regulations did not exempt municipal waste combustion ash from Subtitle C coverage if 
the incinerator that produced the ash burned anything in addition to household waste, including 
nonhazardous industrial waste. City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1591. If the mixed ash was 
sufficiently toxic, a facility such as petitioner's would faU within the scope of Subtitle C 
hazardous waste generator regulations. [d. Such a facility would not faU within the ambit of 
Subtitle C treatment, storage, and disposal facilities regulations because aU the waste it burned 
would be characterized as nonhazardous. [d. An ash can be hazardous, however, even if the 
product from which the ash is generated is not hazardous because contaminants in the new 
medium are more concentrated and readily leachable. [d. 
134. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. 98-616, § 223, 98 Stat. 
3221, 3252 (1984). 
135. 42 U.S.C .. § 6921(i). 
136. S. REp. No. 98-284, at 61 (1983). 
137. On September 18, 1992, just seven weeks before the presidential election, EPA 
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The City of Chicago could win either if the Court held that the plain 
meaning of Section 3001(i) required an exemption for mixed household and 
nonhazardous waste, or if the Court concluded that the statute was ambigu-
ous and that the EPA's construction of the statute was permissible within the 
meaning of Chevron. 138 The City argued that Section 3001 's plain meaning 
required an exemption for ash because it stated that a resource recovery facil-
ity "shall not be deemed to be . . . disposing of . . . hazardous wastes"; 139 
because ash is the only material that such a facility would be "disposing of," 
the statute must intend to exempt such material from the defInition of hazard-
ous waste. The Environmental Defense Fund, however, argued that the 
exemption applied only to the facility itself and not to the ash the facility 
generated. 140 
b. The Supreme Court 
Justice Scalia's majority opinion, which all members of the Court except 
Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined, adopted the Environmental Defense 
Fund's plain meaning argument. 141 According to Justice Scalia, "[t]he plain 
meaning of [Section 3001(i)] is that as long as a facility recovers energy by 
incineration of the appropriate waste, it (the facility) is not subject to Subtitle 
C regulation as a facility that treats, stores, disposes of, or manages hazard-
ous waste."142 On the other hand, Section 3001(i) "quite clearly does not 
Administrator William Reilly sent a memorandum to all agency regional offices announcing 
that he interpreted the text and legislative history of Section 3001(i) to exempt municipal 
combustion ash from Subtitle C regulation even if the material failed the agency's toxicity 
characteristic analysis, and further argued that such an exemption best served both environ-
mental and resource recovery goals for nonhazardous solid waste. See Lazarus & Newman, 
supra note 2, at 9-10 (citing Memorandum from the EPA Administrator to Regional 
Administrators Regarding Exemption for Municipal Waste Combustion Ash from Hazardous 
Waste Regulation (Sept. 18, 1992». 
138. Most commentators thought that the City would win, and that its stronger claim 
was the Chevron deference argument. See Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 2-3, 10-11. 
The City, however, emphasized its plain meaning argument because a Chevron deference 
victory might be pyrrhic if the EPA later changed its interpretation of the statute. See id. 
at 11. 
139. Brieffor the City of Chicago at 14-18, City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense 
Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588 (1994) (No. 92-1639) [hereinafter Chicago Brief]; Lazarus & 
Newman, supra note 2, at 12. The City also relied on the 1984 Senate report as further 
evidence that Congress intended to exclude municipal combustion ash from Subtitle C 
because ash is the only material "generated" by a resource recovery facility. Chicago Brief, 
supra, at 23-28; Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 12. 
140. Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 9. 
141. See id. at 19-20. 
142. City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1591. 
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contain any exclusion for the ash itself. Indeed, the waste the facility pro-
duces (as opposed to that which it receives) is not even mentioned. "143 In 
addition, the Court concluded that Section 3001(i) "does not even exempt the 
facility in its capacity as a generator of hazardous waste" because the statute 
does not include the word "generating" among the list of resource recovery 
facility activities that are exempt from Subtitle C regulation. 144 According 
to the Court: "We think it follows from the carefully constructed text of 
[S]ection 3001(i) that while a resource recovery facility's management 
activities are excluded from Subtitle C regulation, its generation of toxic ash 
is not. ,,145 
In accordance with his textualist approach to statutory interpretation, 
Justice Scalia characteristically refused to consider legislative history in the 
Senate committee report that included "generation" among the list of exempt 
activities. l46 The Court cautioned that "it is the statute, and not the Commit-
tee Report, which is the authoritative expression of the law, and the statute 
prominently omits reference to generation." 147 
The Court acknowledged that the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act's "twin goals of resource recovery and protecting against contamination 
sometimes conflict. "148 The Court stated that the statutory text was "the most 
reliable guide" for reconciling diverse statutory purposes. 149 The Court re-
jected the Solicitor General's plea for deference under Chevron to the EPA's 
interpretation of the statute because, in the majority's view, the agency's 
interpretation "goes beyond the scope of whatever ambiguity [Section] 
3001(i) contains. . . . Section 3001(i) simply cannot be read to contain the 
143. [d. 
144. [d. at 1592. The statute exempts facilities "treating, storing, disposing of, or 
otherwise managing hazardous wastes." [d.; see 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1994). 
145. City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1592. The Court also concluded that Section 
3001(i) had overruled the waste stream exemption in the EPA's 1980 regulations and, 
therefore, that ash generated exclusively from household waste was now subject to Subtitle 
C generator requirements. [d. at 1593; see Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 22-23 
(stating that City had probably assumed that likely worst case scenario if it lost was that it 
would have to burn only household waste; thus, Court's determination that Section 3001(i) 
preempted EPA's pre-existing 1980 rule was stunning defeat for City). 
146. See City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1593 (refusing to rely upon word "generation" 
in committee report, S. REp. No. 98-294, at 61 (1983), that was not included in statutory 
text). 
147. [d. at 1593. The Court observed that nothing in the dissent or legislative history 
"convinces us that the statute's omission of the term 'generation' is a scrivener's error." [d. 
at 1593 n.3. 
148. [d. at 1594. 
149. [d. 
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cost-saving waste stream exemption petitioners seek. "150 
Justice Stevens's dissent, in which Justice O'Connor joined, argued that 
"[t]he relevant statutory text is not as unambiguous as the Court asserts, "151 
and that the 1984 Senate report's inclusion of the term "generation" was 
more representative of Congress's probable intent than the text's omission of 
that same word.152 The dissent essentially argued that Section 3001(i) could 
reasonably be read to extend the reach of the EPA's 1980 waste stream 
exemption for household waste to the incineration of mixtures of household 
wastes and nonhazardous commercial and industrial wastes, while at the 
same time preserving the 1980 rule's scope. 153 Justice Stevens's dissent 
concluded that Congress wanted the EPA rather than the judiciary to balance 
environmental, recovery, and cost issues. l54 
c. Analysis 
While the City of Chicago decision provides significant support for the 
Lazarus-Newman thesis that a textualist approach often allows fewer excep-
tions from environmental statutes for regulated industries than a method of 
statutory construction that relies heavily upon legislative history, there are 
aspects of the decision that ought to be troubling to environmentalists. First, 
Justice Scalia's opinion tends to read the authority of the EPA restrictively 
and to deny the agency regulatory flexibility. In a different context, a 
narrow textualist interpretation of a statute could leave the EPA or another 
agency without power to protect the environment or public health. Further-
more, textualism can be a double-edged sword because many statutes could 
plausibly be read two different ways: either for or against the environment. 
Looking at the text of Section 3001(i) alone, Justice Scalia may well have 
150. [d. Because the Court concluded that the statute was clear and Chevron deference 
to the EPA's interpretation was not warranted, the Court did not consider the interesting 
question of whether "an agency interpretation expressed in a memorandum like the 
Administrator's in this case is entitled to any less deference under Chevron than an interpre-
tation adopted by a rule published in the Federal Register, or by adjudication." [d. at 1594 
n.5. That issue is beyond the scope of this Article. For the purposes of this Article, the 
important point is that the Court should have deferred to the EPA's interpretation if it had 
been duly promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking in the Federal Register 
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (setting forth 
requirements for notice-and-comment ruIemaking). 
151. City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1593 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
152. See id. at 1596-97 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
153. See id. at 1594-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 
22. 
154. See City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1598 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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had the better argument, as six other justices agreed, but some lower court 
judges and commentators thought the statutory language could be read to 
mean the exact opposite - that municipal waste combustion ash was auto-
matically exempt from Subtitle C regulation. 155 Even Professor Lazarus and 
Ms. Newman recognized in a subsequent law review article that "the defini-
tion of 'plain meaning' is itself anything but plain" and that there were "cer-
tainly ample superficial signs of ambiguity" concerning Section 3001(i).156 
Because textualist analysis often does not yield a determinate interpretation, 
courts ought to consider a statute's legislative history. The 1984 Senate 
report provided a more definite explanation of Section 3001(i)'s intent than 
did its text. 
Most importantly, the majority erred in asserting that the text provided 
"the most reliable guide" for reconciling the statute's sometimes conflicting 
"twin goals of resource recovery and protecting against contamination. " 157 
In light of the statutory scheme's mind-numbing complexity,158 Justice 
Stevens's dissent appropriately argued that Congress wanted the EPA rather 
than the courts to answer the question of whether the costs of requiring 
municipal incinerators to comply with Subtitle C are justified by the addi-
tional benefits gained. 159 
2. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities 
for a Great Oregon 
One year after City of Chicago, the Supreme Court abandoned rigid 
textualism and took a more deferential view toward agency decisionmaking 
in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon. 160 
155. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 931 F.2d 211,213 
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding that Section 3001(i) exempts municipal combustion ash from Subtitle 
C hazardous waste regulation); Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 3 n.10 (noting that 
most commentators thought City of Chicago was more likely to prevail on plain meaning 
argument than Environmental Defense Fund); id. at 15-19 (describing Environmental 
Defense Fund attorneys' discussion of objections to their plain meaning argument). 
156. Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 15-16. 
157. City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1594. 
158. See American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(describing process of interpreting statute as "mind-numbing journey"). 
159. See City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1598 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Diane 
L. Hughes, Note, Justice Stevens's Method of Statutory Interpretation: A Well-Tailored 
Means for Facilitating Environmental Regulation, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 493, 495-96 
(1995) (arguing that Justice Stevens only applies Chevron deference to agency interpretations 
when good case exists for interstitial agency lawmaking). 
160. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995). 
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Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion and Justice Scalia dissented in a 
six-to-three decision. 161 
a. Background 
Section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) makes 
it unlawful for any person to "take" an endangered species,162 and Section 
3(19) defines "take" to mean to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, 
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct." 163 
The Fish and Wildlife Service of the Interior Department, acting under the 
authority of the Secretary of Interior, defmed the word "harm" in Section 
3(19) to include "significant habitat modification or degradation where it 
actually kills or injures wildlife. "164 The timber industry and property rights 
activists contended that the regulation's defmition was broader than Congress 
had intended when it enacted the statute. 165 
b . . The Supreme Court 
Justice Stevens's majority opinion argued that the text of the statute 
provided three reasons for concluding that the Secretary of Interior's inter-
pretation of the statute was reasonable. l66 First, the Court used the dictio-
nary defmition of the verb form of "harm," which is "to cause hurt or 
damage to: injure," to fmd that the agency's defmition was consistent with 
the "ordinary understanding" of the word and that such a "defmition natu-
rally encompasses habitat modification that results in actual injury or death 
to members of an endangered or threatened species. "167 Second, the Court 
161. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice O'Connor also filed a concur-
ring opinion. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Thomas. Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 
115 S. Ct. 2407, 2409 (1995). 
162. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994); see Starla K. Dill, Note, Animal Habitats in 
Harm's Way: Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 25 
ENVTL. L. 513, 516 (1995). 
163. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19); Dill, supra note 162, at 516. 
164. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994); Dill, supra note 162, at 516. 
165. See generally Craig Robert Baldauf, Comment, Searching for a Place to Call 
Home: Courts, Congress, and Common Killers Conspire to Drive Endangered Species Into 
Extinction, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 847 (1995). 
166. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2412. 
167. Id. at 2412-13. The Court rejected the argument that the word "harm" in the Act 
should be limited to direct attempts to kill an endangered species and not apply to indirect 
harms resulting from habitat destruction; the Court pointed out that the dictionary definition 
does not limit itself to direct injuries and, furthermore, that the word "harm" as used in the 
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found that "the broad purpose of the ESA supports the Secretary's decision 
to extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms Congress 
enacted the statute to avoid. "168 Third, the Court concluded that Congress's 
addition of Section 10, the "incidental take" permit provision, to the 1982 
amendments169 evidenced that Congress understood the Act to apply to 
indirect as well as direct harm. 170 The Court reached this conclusion because 
it found that the most likely use for such a permit, which the Secretary 
grants as an exception to Section 9(a)(1)(B)'s prohibition against takings of 
endangered species to an individual whose activities will cause incidental 
harm to an endangered species if the applicant provides a satisfactory conser-
vation plan for minimizing any such harm, was to avert liability for habitat 
modification. 171 In addition, the Court stated that the plain meaning of 
Section lO's requirement of a conservation plan makes sense only as "an 
alternative to a known, but undesired, habitat modification. " 172 
In addition, the Court criticized the court of appeals' use of the noscitur 
a sociis canon of statutory construction173 to conclude that "'harm' must refer 
to a direct application of force because the words around it do," given that 
"[s]everal of the words that accompany 'harm' in the [Section] 3 definition 
of 'take,' especially 'harass,' 'pursue,' 'wound,' and 'kill,' refer to actions 
or effects that do not require the direct applications of force"; the Court also 
criticized the court of appeals for giving the word "'harm' essentially the 
same function as other words in the definition, thereby denying it independ-
ent meaning. "174 Although textualists try to rely on canons of construction 
to resolve the meaning of ambiguous words,175 courts, as in this case, often 
disagree about which canon is most suitable for understanding a text's 
meaning. 176 
statute would be mere surplusage unless it encompassed indirect harms. [d. at 2413. 
168. [d. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the reasoning from TVA v. Hill, which stated 
that "[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend 
toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only in the stated policies 
of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute. n [d. at 2413 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 
437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978». 
169. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994). 
170. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2414. 
171. See id. 
172. [d. at 2414 n.14. 
173. According to the noscitur a sociis canon of statutory construction, words tend to 
have the same meaning as their surrounding statutory language. 
174. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2414-15. 
175. See supra notes 30, 116, and accompanying text. 
176. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 275 (noting that courts can choose among 
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Finally, the Court, invoking the Chevron deference principle, found that 
the definition of the word "harm" in the statute was ambiguous and that the 
Secretary's interpretation was reasonable.177 Citing a 1986 law review article 
by Justice Breyer written before his appointment to the Supreme COurt,178 the 
majority asserted that "[t]he latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing 
the statute, together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its 
enforcement, establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the 
Secretary's reasonable interpretation" and that "[w]hen it enacted the ESA, 
Congress delegated broad administrative and interpretive power to the 
Secretary .... The proper interpretation of a term such as 'harm' involves 
a complex policy choice. "179 The Court concluded: "When Congress has 
entrusted the Secretary with broad discretion, we are especially reluctant to 
substitute our views of wise policy for [the Secretary's]."lso 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the words "take" and 
"harm" as used in the Act could not possibly mean "habitat modification. "181 
Furthermore, Justice Scalia contended that even if the Secretary's regulation 
served the broad purpose of the statute, the majority had failed to demon-
strate that the whole text of the statute justified a ban on significant habitat 
modification by private persons. 182 
Notably, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's approach was inconsis-
tent with the plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation in his City of 
Chicago decision. First, Justice Scalia asserted that it was inappropriate for 
the majority to examine the legislative history of the 1973 Act "when the 
enacted text is as clear as this. "183 In addition, Justice Scalia conceded that 
different statutory canons to reach desired result); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON 
LAwTRADmoN: DECIDING APPEALS 521-35 (1960) (compiling list to demonstrate that every 
canon has countercanon). 
177. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2416. In addition, according to the Court, the 
legislative history of the statute supported the conclusion that the Secretary's definition of 
harm was based upon a permissible construction of the Act. Id. at 2416-17. 
178. Id. at 2416 (citing Breyer, supra note 77, at 373). Breyer joined the Supreme 
Court after the City of Chicago decision, but in time for the Sweet Home decision. 
179. Id. at 2416, 2418. 
180. Id. at 2418 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)). 
181. Id. at 2421-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
182. Id. at 2426 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
183. Id. at 2426-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing City of Chicago v. Environmental 
Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1593 (1994)). Justice Scalia also disagreed with the 
majority's interpretation of the legislative history of the 1973 Act, arguing that Congress 
intended that the Section 5 land acquisition program would be the sole means to address the 
destruction of critical habitat by private persons on private land. Id. at 2427-28 (Scalia, J., 
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the legislative history of the 1982 amendments "clearly contemplate[s] that 
it will enable the Secretary to permit environmental modification," but he 
strongly contended that it was inappropriate to consider this legislative 
history when "the text of the amendment cannot possibly bear that asserted 
meaning, when placed within the context of an Act that must be interpreted 
(as we have seen) not to prohibit private environmental modification." 184 
Citing the City of Chicago decision, Justice Scalia maintained that "[t]he 
neutral language of the amendment cannot possibly alter that interpretation, 
nor can its legislative history be summoned forth to contradict, rather than 
clarify, what is in its totality an unambiguous statutory text. "185 
c. Analysis 
The majority opinion in Sweet Home was inconsistent with the spirit and 
tone of Justice Scalia's narrow textualist majority opinion in City of 
Chicago. 186 Even to the extent that Justice Stevens applied a textualist 
approach to reading the ESA, he read the word "harm" more broadly than 
Justice Scalia, illustrating that the use of a plain meaning or textualist ap-
proach to statutory construction does not always result in a consensus. In 
any difficult case involving statutory construction, a judge applying a textual-
ist approach easily could rule either in favor of or against an environmental 
advocacy group. Other methods of statutory interpretation may" produce 
equally indeterminate results, but textualists are perhaps more inclined to 
think they can solve interpretation issues without deferring to the experience 
of administrative agencies. 
One may speculate that Justice Breyer's addition to the Court was a 
factor in the Court's shift from a plain meaning statutory interpretation 
approach that rejected the EPA's interpretation of whether ash is hazardous 
waste to a deferential application of Chevron in approving the Fish and 
Wildlife Service's definition of "take" and "harm."I87 Probably because 
three members of the City of Chicago majority had joined his majority 
opinion in Sweet Home,188 Justice Stevens avoided the delicate issue of 
dissenting) . 
184. [d. at 2428 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
185. [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1593). 
186. See supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text. 
187. See Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 22 ("Indeed, one could speculate that 
if Justice Breyer had been on the Court at the time of [the City of Chicago] litigation, the 
case might have been decided differently. "). 
188. Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg were in the majority in both City of 
Chicago and Sweet Home. 
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whether the two cases were consistent, but his silence on the issue means that 
one can only guess whether and how the Supreme Court will apply Chevron 
in future cases. The Supreme Court needs to develop a consistent approach 
for reading complex regulatory statutes and for employing Chevron. 
D. Textualists Devalue Environmental Agencies 
It is not clear whether adopting a consistently textualist approach to 
statutory interpretation would result in a greater or lesser number of victories 
for environmental advocacy groups, but considerable evidence indicates that 
textualists tend to devalue the policy balances struck by environmental 
agencies between broad pro-environmental aspirational language and narrow 
pro-industry exceptions. In particular, the Supreme Court's Adamo decision, 
Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion in PUD, and Justice Scalia's dissenting 
opinion in Sweet Home demonstrate how a narrow textualist reading of 
environmental statutes can result in courts allowing agencies too little author-
ity to regulate environmental harm. If textualist analysis frequently produced 
clear answers about Congress's statutory intent, then it might be appropriate 
for courts to override the views of agencies. However, environmental stat-
utes often contain conflicting or ambiguous provisions, and agencies are in 
the best position to adopt an interpretation that addresses a wide range of 
policy concerns. 
v. Why Both Courts and Agencies Should 
Consider Legislative History 
Professor Lazarus and Ms. Newman concede that textualist statutory 
interpretation will sometimes lead courts to ignore legislative history that 
favors the environment, but they are willing to forgo such favorable material 
to keep out information indicating that the legislature intended to allow 
exceptions to aspirational textual language. 189 Although a statute's legislative 
history sometimes does not reflect congressional intent and judges can misuse 
such material to reach a result at odds with the legislature's intent or pur-
pose, interpreters should consider both a statute's text and its relevant 
legislative history as the best means to ascertain the intent of the legislature. 
As Part VI explains, only after a court or agency determines which interpre-
tation most probably captures a statute's intent should it possibly allow policy 
considerations to outweigh that intent. 190 
189. Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 23. 
190. See infra notes 298-300, 309-11, and accompanying text. 
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A. General Principles of Legislative History 
For most of the nineteenth century, judges focused on statutory texts, 
policy concerns, and canons of construction, but during the twentieth cen-
tury, courts came to rely quite extensively on legislative history materials. 191 
In theory, judges generally agree that consultation of legislative history is 
unnecessary if the statutory text has a plain and unambiguous meaning. l92 
In practice, judges have often relied on contradictory legislative history to 
justify an interpretation of a statute that appears to be at odds with its textual 
meaning. l93 In 1983, Judge Patricia Wald remarked that "[n]o occasion for 
statutory construction now exists when the [Supreme] Court will not look at 
the legislative history." 194 
1. The Textualist Critique of Legislative History 
Beginning in the late 1980s, a critical mass of judges and scholars, most 
notably Justice Scalia, began to castigate the use of legislative history in 
interpreting statutes and instead advocated some type of textualist approach 
to statutory interpretation. 195 Because Justices Scalia and Thomas are gener-
ally unwilling to join any part of another Justice's opinion that relies upon 
legislative history, they have been able to influence other Justices who want 
their votes and who are willing to drop references to legislative history. 196 
The majority of Justices on the Court, however, have remained willing to 
consider legislative history and have rejected a rigid textualist approach to 
legislative history. 197 
191. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 207. See generally Carro & Brann, supra note 
37 (providing statistical study showing that Supreme Court increasingly used legislative 
history from 1938 to 1979 and that increase in usage was especially rapid after 1970). In 
1892, the Supreme Court used evidence from a committee report to conclude that a statute's 
general prohibition against labor contracts to assist inImigration did not apply to clergy. See 
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 464-65 (1892); EsKRIDGE, supra note 
12, at 208-10. 
192. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (citing Hamilton v. 
Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899)); Spence, supra note 26, at 590. 
193. See Spence, supra note 26, at 590; Wald, supra note 37, at 197-99. 
194. Wald, supra note 37, at 195; see also EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 207. 
195. See generally Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruc-
tion, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 43 (1988); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutional-
ism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARy L. REv. 827 (1991); W. 
David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the 
Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383, 383-84 (1992). 
196. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 365-66. 
197. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610-11 nA (1991) 
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TextuaIists frequently argue that it is improper to rely upon material that 
was never voted on by the House or Senate and never presented to the 
President as legislation. 198 Some textualists allege that legislators rarely read 
committee reports, which judges usually regard as the most reliable form of 
legislative historyl99 and, therefore, claim that judges ignore reality in most 
instances if they treat such reports as embodying the intent of Congress. 200 
Even worse, textuaIists often contend that special interest groups, congressio-
nal staff, or individual legislators try to influence subsequent judicial inter-
pretation of a statute by deliberately manipulating legislative history. WI 
In addition, critics of legislative history usually assert that there is no 
intent of the legislature because most members of Congress do not have a 
specific intent about all the issues in a bill, the intent of members may 
change in the give-and-take of legislative compromise, and it is usually 
impossible to know the aggregate intent of large groups of people.202 More-
(Justice White, joined by eveIY member of Supreme Court except Justice Scalia, responding 
to Scalia's concurring opinion and briefly defending use of legislative histoIY in "good-faith 
effort to discern legislative intent"); Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 363-65 (noting 
that majority of Justices on Court have remained willing to consider legislative histoIY); 
Slawson, supra note 195, at 383 (same). 
198. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing and relying on INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983»; 
Mashaw, supra note 195, at 843 (arguing that federalist principles support textualism); 
Slawson, supra note 195, at 406,417; Spence, supra note 26, at 591-92; Zeppos, supra note 
26, at 1300-01. 
199. Justice Scalia, however, believes that amendments defeated on the floor and 
extended floor debates which alter the final text are the most reliable form of legislative 
histoIY and, contraIY to traditional wisdom, that committee reports are the least reliable. 
Farber & Frickey, supra note 13, at 442 n.64 (quoting unpublished address by Judge 
Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative HistoIY (delivered between fall 1985 and 
spring 1986 at various law schools in vaIYing forms». 
200. See George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": 
The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legisla-
tive History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 41-43; Spence, supra note 26, at 592-93. 
201. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(charging that committee reports are often drafted by staff members at their own initiative 
or at suggestion of lawyer-lobbyist); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(Easterbrook, J.) ("[L]egislative histoIY is a poor guide to legislators' intent because it is 
written by the staff rather than members of Congress .... "); see also EsKRIDGE, supra 
note 12, at 220-22 (discussing textualist charge that committee staff or even lobbyists write 
biased legislative histoIY); Slawson, supra note 195, at 397 (alleging that agency staff and 
members of Congress "manufacture" legislative histoIY); Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1302-03 
(discussing charge that committee staff or even lobbyists write biased legislative histoIY). 
202. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
("[W]hiIe it is possible to discern the objective 'purpose' of a statute ... or even the formal 
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over, textualists point out that courts sometimes rely on the comments of a 
single legislator, especially the sponsor of a bill, to determine its meaning, 
but that reliance on a single legislator is likely to be misleading. 203 Further-
more, the legislative record is often incomplete or misleading about the 
intentions of either individuals or groups, especially because legislators or 
staff members may consciously try to manipulate legislative history. 204 Many 
textualists are also proponents of "public choice" theory, which emphasizes 
the role of economic interest groups in the legislative process,205 and often 
argue that the only reliable evidence of the deals struck by interest groups in 
Congress is the actual text of a statute. 206 
Textualists also argue that the use of legislative history can allow judges 
to impose their value preferences and political beliefs in contradiction to the 
apparent meaning of the statutory text.207 Because judges are frequently able 
motivation for a statute where that is explicitly set forth, . . . discerning the subjective 
motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task. H); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 548-49 (1983) (arguing 
that it is impossible to assess aggregate intent of Congress); Max Radin, Statutory Interpre-
tation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870-71 (1930) (same); see also Kenneth A. Shepsle, 
Congress Is a 'They,' Not an 'It': Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 lNT'L REv. L. & 
EcON. 239, 239-56 (1992) (arguing that existence of cyclical majorities renders legislative 
intent altogether irrelevant to statutory interpretation and, therefore, courts should look only 
at text and not at legislative history). But see EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 212-13 (noting 
that since 1930s, Congress has been on notice that courts consider legislative history); James 
Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REv. 886, 888-92 (1930) 
(arguing that judge may ascertain probable intent of Congress from majority's assent to 
committee reports and legislative amendments). . 
203. See, e.g., North Haven Board of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 524-27 (1982) 
(relying extensively on remarks by Senator Birch Bayh, the bill's sponsor, to determine 
meaning of prohibition against gender discrimination in Title IX); Slawson, supra note 195, 
at 397 ("All it takes is one member of Congress declaring on the floor his or her 'under-
standing' of what some vague portion of the bill is 'intended to mean.'"); Zeppos, supra 
note 26, at 1302 (noting that courts sometimes rely on remarks of sponsor to determine 
statute's intent). Slawson notes: "Normally, however, two members, one of whom is a 
sponsor of the bill, cooperate. The second member asks the sponsor what the bill is 
intended to mean, and the sponsor answers." Slawson, supra note 195, at 397. 
204. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 212; Pierce, supra note 37, at 741; Spence, supra 
note 26, at 592. 
205. See Watson, supra note 12, at 216. 
206. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 202, at 540-45 (arguing that courts should only 
enforce deals clearly expressed in language of statute). But see Richard A. Posner, Econom-
ics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 263, 274-
75 (1982) (noting that terms of interest group deal in Congress are as likely to be reflected 
in committee reports and floor comments as in text of statute). 
207. See Scalia, supra note 24, at 1176; Spence, supra note 26, at 13. 
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to choose from among conflicting portions of legislative history, they can cite 
only those portions that suit their predilections. 208 Thus, judges may misuse 
legislative history to impose an interpretation that is contrary to the intent of 
the congressional majority that enacted the legislation. 209 
2. The Argument for Legislative History 
Defenders of the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation 
often acknowledge that it can be misused,210 but argue that it can be useful 
in ascertaining the intent or purpose of Congress in enacting a particular 
statute.211 The textualist argument that legislators and their staff persistently 
misuse legislative history is greatly overstated because competition among 
conflicting interest groups tends to keep the system honest. 212 Many legisla-
tors avow that they do read committee reports, and some claim that they are 
more likely to read the committee report than the text of the statute. 213 
208. See ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1583 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., dissenting) 
("We in the judiciary have become shamelessly profligate and unthinking in our use of 
legislative history .... "); Pierce, supra note 37, at 751; Wald, supra note 37, at 214 
(discussing ability of judges to use selective portions of legislative history). 
209. See Pierce, supra note 37, at 741 (arguing that revival of textualism during 1980s 
was to some extent healthy development counteracting improper use of legislative history). 
210. See, e.g., Mikva, supra note 39, at 384; Pierce, supra note 37, at 751; Spence, 
supra note 26, at 599; Wald, supra note 37, at 214 (discussing ability of judges to use 
selective portions of legislative history). 
211. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(posner, J.). 
212. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICALlNTRODUCTION 98-99 (1991); James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on 
Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 
1,51-52 (1994); Spence, supra note 26, at 607. But see Slawson, supra note 195, at 397-98 
(arguing that it is difficult for opposing members of Congress to respond to or even learn 
about biased legislative history). 
213. See Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View in Seeking Congress' Will, 48 
CONGo Q. 913, 917 (1990) (relating Senator Specter's view that he is more likely to read 
committee report than text of statute); Brudney, supra note 212, at 28; Farber & Frickey, 
supra note 13, at 445 ("[A]ccording to a principal study of congressional policymaking 
procedures, legislators outside the committee and their staffs focus primarily upon the 
report, not the bill itself. H); Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. 
REV 181, 184 (1986) (former Congressman and then Judge on the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit commenting on legislators' reading of committee report 
rather than statutory text); Slawson, supra note 195, at 404 ("Legislators rarely read the 
entire text of a bill on which they vote, and sometimes they do not read any of it, relying 
instead on committee reports, staff summaries, and discussions and debates with other 
legislators. "). 
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On the other hand, even if the textualist argument that legislators pay 
little attention to committee reports is at least partly correct, that contention 
raises questions about whether slothful legislators even read the statutory 
texts that textualists consider so important. 214 Furthermore, the criticism that 
legislative history may be written by an unrepresentative minority applies 
equally well to the text itself.2ls Textualists implicitly create a false dichot-
omy between an objective, reliable, and clear text and manipulable legislative 
history. 216 
In addition, Scalia's argument that courts should look at the text because 
it alone has been passed by both Houses and presented to the President 
erroneously confuses the Article I limits on congressional power to make 
laws with the Article III powers employed by courts in applying and inter-
preting laws.217 Legislative history itself is not "the law," but it can help 
judges and agencies interpret a statute's language. 218 Thus, judges or agen-
cies can and should look at both the text and its legislative history to under-
stand what Congress meant. 
Although textualists often argue that judges can use legislative history 
to disregard the intent of the congressional majority, ignoring legislative 
history is more likely to enhance judicial power at the expense of Congress 
because textualists refuse to consider one of the most important ways that 
Congress actually communicates its policy views - through legislative 
history.219 As long as Congress continues to rely on committee reports and 
floor debates to explain legislation to members who do not belong to a 
committee that was involved in drafting a bill, courts should treat legislative 
history with a degree of respect.220 
214. See Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1311-13. But see Slawson, supra note 195, at 404-
05 (arguing that even if legislators are more likely, on average, to read bill's legislative 
historY than its actual text, fact that text is always available to members while certain types 
of legislative history may not be available means that text has more democratic legitimacy 
than legislative history). 
215. See Brudney, supra note 212, at 53; Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1311-13. 
216. See Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1323. 
217. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 845, 862-63 (1992); Brudney, supra note 212, at 42; Eskridge, supra note 23, 
at 671-72. 
218. See Brudney, supra note 212, at 42-43. 
219. See id. at 40; Spence, supra note 26, at 593-94; Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1313-
14, 1331-32. 
220. See Brudney, supra note 212, at 45-46 (arguing that courts should respect 
Congress's use of legislative history); Spence, supra note 26, at 593-94, 604-07 (same). But 
see Hatch, supra note 195, at 44-45 (expressing concern about role of staff in creating 
legislative history relied upon by courts). 
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Moreover, despite the difficulties in getting a cumbersome institution 
such as Congress to override a judicial decision, 221 some empirical studies 
suggest that Congress is more likely to override textualist judicial interpreta-
tions of statutes than ones that consider the relevant legislative history. 222 
Congressional reversals of statutory decisions appear to have increased 
significantly during the 1980s.223 There are a number of possible explana-
tions for the rise in such overrides, including Professor Eskridge's thesis that 
such reversals resulted in large part during the 1980s from conflict between 
a conservative president and Supreme Court on one hand and an increasingly 
lIberal Congress on the other. 224 It may be significant, however, that Profes-
sors Solimine and Walker found that "a disproportionate number of overrid-
den cases used a 'plain meaning' analysis. "225 One difficulty in assessing the 
finding that Congress is more likely to override the Supreme Court's textual-
ist interpretations of statutes is whether the choice of textualism alone is 
significant or whether textualism is often associated with conservative politi-
cal views that influence how courts decide issues and how a libe~al Congress 
might respond to a textualist opinion.226 One study found that judges ap-
221. See Herz, supra note 42, at 204; Spence, supra note 26, at 602-03. But see John 
Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1267, 1281-86, 1290-1315, 1319 
(1996) (acknowledging that current congressional procedures for correcting statutory 
mistakes are inadequate, but arguing that "Corrections Day" process can enable Congress 
to pass corrective legislation more easily). Between 1967 and 1990, Congress overrode 121 
Supreme Court statutory interpretations or more than an average of 5 per year. See William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretations, 101 YALE L.1. 331, 
344 (1991). 
222. See West Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112-16 (1991) (Stevens, 
1., dissenting); Eskridge, supra note 221, app. I at 424-41, app. ill at 450-55 (finding 
relatively strong evidence that Congress is more likely to override textualist Supreme Court 
decisions by amending or enacting new legislation); Michael E. Solimine & James L. 
Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 
TEMP. L. REV. 425, 451 (1992) (finding that empirical data on statutory overrulings of 
Supreme Court decisions "lends some mild support to the view expressed by Justice Stevens 
that textual decisions by the Court are often overturned by Congress"). 
223. See Eskridge, supra note 221, at 395-96; Solimine & Walker, supra note 222, at 
435,451. 
224. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/ 
President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613, 616-17 (1991); Eskridge, supra note 
221, at 395-96. 
225. See Solimine & Walker, supra note 222, at 448 (finding that whether Supreme 
Court employed plain meaning test was statistically significant at .001 level in explaining 
congressional overrides of Court's statutory decisions based on random sample of 80 cases). 
226. See Eskridge, supra note 221, at 405-06 (equating textualism with formalist and 
conservative political theory); Eskridge, supra note 23, at 646-50 (same); Solimine & 
Walker, supra note 222, at 448 (arguing that conclusion that Congress is more likely to 
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pointed by President Reagan tended to use a plain meaning approach to 
impose their own political preferences rather than the preferences of the 
then Democratic congressional majority.227 Regardless of textualism's 
political implications, if Congress is more likely to override judicial deci-
sions based on a textualist approach to statutory interpretations, courts 
would be wise at least to consider a statute's legislative history.228 
Although legislative history is often useful in understanding a statute, 
Congress does not intend nonstatutory legislative history to be the equiva-
lent of a statute, and judges should not treat it as such.229 However, courts 
can continue to treat certain types of legislative history as being more 
authoritative than others, with contemporaneous committee reports usually 
seen as the most reliable and subsequent legislative history as the least 
reliable.230 Even Judge Easterbrook, who strongly supports a textualist 
approach and is highly critical of the way many judges use legislative 
history,231 has stated that legislative history may be used to explicate the 
meaning of a text as long as "it is not a source of legal rules competing 
with those found in the U.S. Code."232 Judge Easterbrook has also argued 
that although a narrow textualist approach to statutory interpretation should 
be used when a statute affects only private interest groups, a broader, more 
remedial reading of statutes is often appropriate for statutes that primarily 
affect the general public. 233 Although some environmental statutes affect 
only a particular industry or even one firm, most are concerned with broad, 
override Supreme Court statutory interpretations based upon plain meaning approach "gives 
little support to the ideology assumptions, unless one is prepared to believe that the Court 
is merely using plain language as a subterfuge for imposing either its ideological preference 
or the wishes of some interest group" (citation omitted)). 
227. See Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U.ILL. L. REv. 
399, 401-02, 420-33; see also Spence, supra note 26, at 601 n.80. 
228. See Spence, supra note 26, at 601. 
229. Id. at 598. 
230. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1990); 
EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 222; Eskridge, supra note 23, at 630-40; Spence, supra note 
26, at 593 n.35. See generally Costello, supra note 200 (offering examples). 
231. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1341-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.); 
Easterbrook, supra note 202, at 540-46 (proposing "clear statement principle" as general 
rule of statutory interpretation); Karkkainen, supra note 28, at 454-55 (comparing and 
contrasting Judge Easterbrook's "clear statement principle" with Justice Scalia's less activist, 
canon-based approach). 
232. Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1344. 
233. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Coun, 1983 Term - Foreword: The 
coun and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 15-16 (1984); Easterbrook, supra 
note 202, at 541-44. 
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public questions and, therefore, require a broader approach than Scalia's 
narrow textualism. 
Finally, Chevron's search for the "intent of Congress"234 is best served 
in most cases by considering legislative history. Although Justice Scalia 
has contended that a textualist methodology is more likely to find that a 
statute is not ambiguous than an approach to statutory interpretation that 
allows extensive examination of legislative history, 235 legislative history is 
more likely to address a specific issue than the text in most cases.236 
Furthermore, the Court has held that legislative history may trump even 
plain statutory language if the statutory language would produce "an odd 
result. "237 Despite the ways agency staff or members of Congress can 
misuse legislative history, examining both a statute's text and its relevant 
legislative history is more likely to indicate the probable intent of Con-
gress about a specific issue than simply scrutinizing the plain meaning of 
the text. 
234. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984). 
235. In a law review article, Justice Scalia argued that he seldom needs to defer to 
agency statutory interpretations under Chevron because he usually finds a clear meaning in 
the statute's text: 
One who finds nwre often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from 
its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the 
triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare 
that Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which, though reason-
able, I would not personally adopt. 
Scalia, supra note 24, at 521; see also Edward C. Donovan, The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and the Boundaries of Agency Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 60 GEO. WASH. 
L. REv. 1357, 1379-84 (1992) (arguing that use of legislative history in first step creates 
more ambiguity and deference to agency). But see infra note 236 and accompanying text. 
236. See Breyer, supra note 77, at 856-61; Farber & Frickey, supra note 13, at 457-58; 
Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 992 n.101 (disagreeing with Justice Scalia's argument 
and arguing that "textualism will answer the 'precise question' at issue in so few cases that 
it'leads courts to abandon the quest for specific congressional answers, thus allowing a 
dramatically expanded judicial role at step one"); Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 366-
70 (arguing that use of legislative history does not, contrary to Justice Scalia's argument, 
result in greater uncertainty about meaning of statutes); Slawson, supra note 195, at 400 
(noting that legislative history is more likely to address specific issue than text); Wald, supra 
note 39, at 301-02. 
237. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) 
(quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989»; Gonzalez, supra 
note 26, at 607; Slawson, supra note 195, at 396, 400. But see Public Citizen, 491 U.S. 
at 473 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that courts should follow statutory text unless 
interpretation produces "absurd result"); Nagle, supra note 221, at 1288 (asserting that 
absurd results doctrine is unclear). 
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B. Using Legislative History to Interpret the Clean Water Act 
An environmental statute's meaning is sometimes better explained by 
its legislative history than its text. For instance, in Train v. Colorado 
Public Interest Research Group, Inc. ,238 a citizen suit was brought against 
the EPA to compel the agency to perform an allegedly nondiscretionary 
duty to regulate the discharges of certain radioactive materials into naviga-
ble waters under the Clean Water Act.239 The Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) and its successors had regulated these materials for many years 
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.240 "The Court of Appeals resolved 
the question exclusively by reference to the language of the statute"241 and 
easily concluded that the EPA had the authority under the Act to regulate 
such materials because "the statute is plain and unambiguous and should be 
given its obvious meaning. "242 The Tenth Circuit observed that the legisla-
tive history was "conflicting and inconclusive," but concluded that it did not 
even have to consider the legislative history because "the legislative intent 
is clearly manifested in the language of the statute itself, and we need not 
resort to legislative history. "243 The Clean Water Act forbids the discharge 
of pollutants into navigable waters unless the discharger has a permit issued 
either by the EPA or by a state that has a permit program approved by the 
EPA.244 "The term 'pollutant' is defined by the [Act] to include, inter alia, 
'radioactive materials,' "245 and neither of the two explicit exceptions to the 
definition of "pollutant" in the statutory text applies to radioactive materi-
als.246 From its analysis of the statutory language, the court of appeals 
concluded that Congress, by referring to "radioactive materials," meant to 
include "all radioactive materials, and we so hold. ,,247 
238. 426 U.S. 1 (1976). 
239. Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 4 (1976); 
Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1364-65. 
240. Train, 426 U.S. at 5. See generally Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-
703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297 (1994». 
241. Train, 426 U.S. at 9. 
242. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Train, 507 F.2d 743, 748 (10th 
Cir. 1974), rev'd, 426 U.S. 1 (1976). 
243. Id. 
244. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342 (1994); Train, 426 U.S. at 7. 
245. Train, 426 U.S. at 7. 
246. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6); see also Train, 426 U.S. at 7-9; Colorado Pub. Interest 
Research Group, 507 F.2d at 747-48. The two exceptions apply to "sewage from vessels" 
and material injected into an oil or gas welL 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6); see also Train, 426 U.S. 
at 7 n.7. 
247. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 507 F.2d at 747; see also Train, 426 U.S. 
HeinOnline -- 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1277 1996
TEXFUALISM AND ENVIRONMENTALISM 1277 
The Supreme Court, however, unanimously reversed the court of 
appeals,248 concluding that attention to the relevant legislative history was 
proper, that consideration of the legislative history demonstrated that 
Congress intended to keep regulation of radioactive material exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the successor 
to the ABC and, therefore, that the EPA had no authority to regulate the 
discharge of the source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials covered 
by the Atomic Energy Act. 249 In Train, a pre-Chevron decision, the Court 
"d[id] not depend upon the EPA interpretation of the Act in ~aching [its] 
conclusion. ,,250 The Court stated that it was proper to consider a statute's 
legislative history as an "aid to construction of the meaning of. words , as 
used in the statute," even if the text appeared to be "clear" upon "superfi-
cial examination. "251 The House committee report explicitly exempted 
radioactive materials regulated by the ABC and expressly stated that only 
radioactive substances not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction were 
within the scope of the proposed Clean Water Act.252 Both the House and 
Senate floor debates, especially a colloquy between Senator Pastore, the 
Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and Senator Muskie, 
the primary author of the Clean Water Act, emphasized that the proposed 
Act did not affect the ABC's exclusive control over the discharge of source, 
byproduct, and special nuclear materials. 253 Furthermore, the House 
rejected an amendment to the Clean Water Act that would have effectively 
eliminated the ABC's control over these materials.254 In light of the 
statute's legislative history, it was reasonable for the Court to reject the 
obvious textualist reading of the Act and to place regulatory authority over 
these materials where Congress intended - with the ABC.25S 
In retrospect, Congress's decision to give the ABC and its successors 
control over these radioactive materials may have been an unsound policy 
choice. Because the EPA regulates many different industries with compet-
at 9. 
248. Justice Stevens did not take part in the case. Train, 426 U.S. at 25. 
249. See id. at 10-25. 
250. Id. at 8 n.8. 
251. Id. at 10 (citations omitted). 
252. Train, 426 U.S. at 11 (quoting H.R. REp. No. 92-911, at 131 (1972». 
253. Id. at 14. A ranking member of the Conference Committee, Representative 
Harsha, reaffirmed that "[t]he conference report does not change the original intent as it was 
made clear in the colloquy between Senators Muskie and Pastore in the course of the debate 
in the other body." Id. at 22 (quoting S. CONF. REp. No. 92-1236, at 226 (1972». 
254. See id. at 17-22. 
255. See Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1365. 
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ing interests, it is less vulnerable to "capture" or disproportionate influence 
by industry than the ABC and its successors, whose very bureaucratic 
existence depends on the continuing viability of the nuclear power 
industry.2S6 Nevertheless, the Train Court's conclusion that the ABC and 
its successors retained exclusive control over the discharge of certain 
radioactive materials was probably the most accurate reading of Congress's 
intent in enacting the Clean Water Act. ' 
On the one hand, Train supports the Lazarus-Newman thesis that the 
legislative histories of environmental statutes often contain pro-industry 
exceptions not found in the text. On the other hand, Train illustrates how 
misleading it can be to try to determine Congress's intent from the text 
alone. Although there is an argument for just considering the text because 
it is the only material that Congress has formally enacted and presented to 
the President, there is a stronger case for considering both the text and the 
legislative history as a means to reconstruct Congress's intent. Professor 
Lazarus and Ms. Newman might argue that the policy consequences of 
adopting a textualist approach that favors environmental advocacy groups 
outweigh the importance of using legislative history to ascertain congressio-
nal intent. Environmental agencies, however, are better suited to address 
the full range of policy issues than a judge trying to deduce the "ordinary 
understanding" of a complex environmental statute. 
VI. Why Textualism Downplays Agency Expertise 
A. Chevron and Statutory Interpretation 
By refusing to defer to any agency interpretation that diverges from the 
plain language of the statutory text, strict textualist judicial review may 
comply with the letter of Chevron's two-part test, but undermines Chev-
ron's basic premise that agencies are better equipped than judges to inter-
pret statutes within the agency's policymaking jurisdiction.257 Traditionally, 
many scholars and judges have believed that courts have a special compe-
256. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 236, 309-10 (suggesting that EPA is not captured 
agency because many different interest groups monitor its actions); Jonathan R. Macey, 
Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 93, 93-94 (1992) (observing that agencies that regulate multiple industries are less 
vulnerable to agency capture than agencies that regulate single industry); Bradford C. Mank, 
Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L,.J. 34, 49-52 (1993) 
(arguing that EPA is less vulnerable to agency capture because it regulates multiple indus-
tries). 
257. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 865-66 (1984); Herz, supra note 42, at 199. 
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tence in interpreting statutes and should supervise agency statutory interpre-
tations to make sure they are consistent with congressional intent.258 Both 
Chevron and some recent scholarship have suggested, however, that agen-
cies may be more adept at discerning statutory meaning because they have 
a closer relationship to the political branches.259 Furthermore, if Congress 
has delegated significant policymaking powers to an agency, then courts 
should generally defer to the agency's interpretation of statutes falling 
within the scope of that policymaking function.260 On the other hand, if a 
question is outside the agency's policymaking domain, a court should give 
the agency's interpretation no more weight than that of any other litigant, 
and the court should exercise the lawfinding function to determine what the 
statute says.261 Of course, drawing the line between these two functions 
raises many questions.262 In addition, courts must still examine whether 
decisions within an agency's policymaking function are reasonable or 
consistent with the underlying statute's purposes.263 Nevertheless, courts 
should "consciously restrict their independent judgments to the 'cognitive' 
core of interpretation where constitutional notions of legislative supremacy 
and conventional notions of institutional competence conspire most strongly 
against administrative hegemony. "264 
Chevron suggested that agencies have a comparative advantage over 
courts in policymaking because agencies possess greater technical expertise 
than judges.265 Some commentators, however, have questioned whether 
agency bureaucrats and scientists actually possess useful technical knowl-
edge that would enable them to make better and more informed decisions 
258. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
259. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. 
L. REv. 549, 574-76 (1985); supra text accompanying notes 59:"61. 
260. See Diver, supra note 259, at 593. 
261. See id. 
262. See id. at 593-98 (discussing difficulties in drawing line between policymaking and 
lawfinding). But see GLEN O. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND 
PUBLIC LAW 179-81 (1991) (discussing Diver's criteria for determining degree of judicial 
deference to agency decisions and arguing that "[iJn the end, Diver's criteria, though useful 
to some degree, tum out to be so ambiguous in application that they fail to provide us with 
much more than the vaguest of guidelines"). 
263. See Diver, supra note 259, at 597. 
264. See id. at 598. 
265. See Herz, supra note 42, at 199; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984). See generally NEIL K. 
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (discussing concept of comparative institutional competence). 
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than members of the general public.266 The EPA and other agencies have 
often overstated the ability of science to resolve issues like the acceptable 
risk from nonthreshold carcinogens that pose some risk in even minute 
amounts.267 Ultimately, decisions about the distribution and amount of 
societal risk in society are political in nature.268 
Nevertheless, experienced EPA engineers, scientists, and managers 
possess a "techno-bureaucratic" expertise based on practical experience with 
a large number of highly complex regulatory issues involving scientific, 
engineering, and policy components that allows them to understand the 
interplay between technical issues and congressional statutes better than the 
general public or most judges.269 Textualism is based on the flawed prem-
ise that courts can use dictionary definitions and the understanding of 
ordinary users of the English language to interpret complex regulatory 
st~tutes. Most noncriminal federal statutes, however, are directed "at a 
266. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1027, 1061-85 (1990) (questioning whether expert quantitative risk assessment 
produces better evaluation of risk than public's concern with various qualitative factors); 
Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative 
Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 562-65, 610-11 (1992) (same). 
267. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1613, 1631-40 (1995). 
268. See Lisa Heinzerling, Political Science, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 449, 472-73 (1995) 
(reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993) and noting need to 
harmonize citizen involvement in regulation with expertise of scientific community). 
269. Professor McGarity has sought to explain how most EPA engineers, scientists, and 
managers make decisions by coining the concept of "techno-bureaucratic rationality": 
Techno-bureaucratic rationality is a rationality built on a unique understanding 
of the regulatory universe that is born out of frustrating hands-on experience with 
unanswerable questions of extraordinary complexity. It is, in a sense, a "second 
best" rationality that recognizes the limitations that inadequate data, unquantifi-
able values, mixed societal goals, and political realities place on the capacity of 
structured rational thinking, and it does the best that it can with what it has. 
THOMAS O. McGARITY, REINvENTING RATIONALTIY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS 
5-6 (1991); see also BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 61-62 (discussing advantages 
of bureaucratic rationalization and substantive expertise). There is evidence, however, that 
experts are little better than laypersons at making predictions, and that statistical formulas 
are better predictors of, for instance, medical school performance than individualized 
judgments of admissions experts. See Farber, supra note 17, at 557 n.113. Because of time 
and information limitations, there is a tendency on the part of agency staff and managers to 
use familiar regulatory approaches rather than innovative ones. See McGARITY, supra, at 
14-16 (noting that regulatory decisionmaking is subject to time and information limitations). 
In recent years, however, the EPA has experimented with a hybrid model of decisionmaking 
that emphasizes interdisciplinary teams and the early involvement of senior administrators 
to insure that a wide range of policies are in fact considered. See id. at 239-62. 
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small community of lawyers, regulators, and people subject to their specific 
regulations" and, therefore, courts should defer to this small community's 
understanding of the statute rather than what might be the plain meaning to 
ordinary users of the English language.27o 
Chevron also stated that agencies are more democratically accountable 
than judges because executive agencies are subject to the ultimate control 
of the President,271 through the appointment and removal power, 272 and also 
are subject to the congressional oversight and budget process.273 Although 
"regulatory agencies are not as representative as the legislature, "274 notice-
and-comment rulemaking in the Federal Register frequently furnishes 
agencies with a far broader perspective on political interests than the 
litigation process and often provides their decisions with a semimajoritarian 
270. Ross, supra note 40, at 1057-62, 1067; see also Farber, supra note 17, at 552-53 
(stating that most statutes are addressed to specialized audiences); Edward L. Rubin, Modern 
Sta1Utes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 
45 VAND. L. REv. 579, 580-87 (1992) (same); Slawson, supra note 195, at 420 (same). A 
smaIl interpretive community may be able to agree on the meaning of a statutory text when 
ordinary users of the language would find a variety of possible meanings or would find that 
the text makes no sense at all. See Ross, supra note 40, at 1057-58, 1067; Rubin, supra, 
at 579-80, 585-87, 591; see also POSNER, supra note 14, at 436-39, 450-51 (discussing and 
criticizing idea of interpretive community of lawyers). See generally Owen M. Fiss, 
Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 177 (1985) (arguing texts have objective meanings as 
defined by interpretive community of lawyers and judges). Professor Stanley Fish has used 
the term "interpretive community" in the sense of a like-thinking group imposing an 
arbitrary meaning on an indeterminate text and, therefore, has at least implicitly raised 
questions about the legitimacy of such communities. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 450 
(discussing Fish's approach). See generally STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS 
CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980). 
271. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 284 (recognizing that agencies have more legitimate' 
political basis than do courts). 
272. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 590 (1984) (arguing that President enjoys 
control over only limited layer of top staff in executive agencies and that political factors 
often make it difficult to exercise control over even top staff who have political constitu-
ency). 
273. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of 
EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, 54 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 206 (stating that "Congress appears to engage in 
more intense and pervasive oversight of EPA than it does of other agencies"); Nagle, supra 
note 221, at 1285-86 ("Members of Congress make fueir views known to agency officials 
at oversight hearings, through letters to an agency, and by staff contacts wifu agency 
employees. . .. lTJhese mefuods frequently prove the most successful in convincing a 
reluctant but intimidated agency to comply wifu congressional wishes (or at least fue wishes 
of some members of Congress). "). 
274. Dwyer, supra note 13, at 284. 
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levelofpolitica1legitimacy.275 In addition, Congress can easily expand the 
ability of the public to participate in agency decisionmaking beyond the 
notice-and-comment procedures in Section 553 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act276 by requiring agencies to hold public hearings; adopting 
hybrid rulemaking procedures, such as giving the public the right to cross-
examine agency or industry expert witnesses; requiring agencies to survey 
public opinion; providing citizens with technical assistance grants to re-
search issues; encouraging regulatory negotiation prior to the issuance of 
rules; or even paying citizens to participate.277 By contrast, courts some-
times g~t a sense of the political realities of an issue from the litigants or 
amicus briefs, but it is normally inappropriate for a judge to discuss pend-
ing litigation with legislators, members of the White House staff, or influ-
entiallobbyists in the same manner as the Administrator of the EPA.278 In 
a few instances, it may be necessary for courts to reverse an agency policy 
that appears to be biased in favor of a special interest group and against the 
public interest, as defined by the applicable statute, but the involvement of 
public interest groups, competition among competing industries, and the 
professional training of agency staff make agencies less vulnerable to 
"capture" than commentators have occasionally suggested.279 
275. See id. (suggesting that agencies often possess "semimajoritarian cast"); Jerry L. 
Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle 
Sqfety, 4 YALEJ. ON REG. 257, 272 (1987) (noting that feedback from numerous sources 
can make agencies acutely aware of public opinion and political currents surrounding regula-
tory issues). 
276. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994). 
277. See Bradford C. Mank, What Comes After Technology: Using an "Exception Proc-
ess" to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 STAN. ENVTL. 
LJ. 263, 33843 (1994) (discussing several ways to in<;:rease public participation in adminis-
trative decisionmaking including mandating formal or informal public hearings and providing 
technical assistance grants to allow citizens to research complex issues); see also Richard 
H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 72-
86 (1995) (discussing use of quantitative survey techniques for gauging public opinion about 
issues). See generally Ellen Siegler, RegUlatory Negotiations: A Practical Perspective, 22 
ENVTL. L. REp. (News & Analysis) 10647 (1992) (discussing regulatory negotiation); Carl 
Tobias, Great Expectations and Mismatched Compensation: Government Sponsored Public 
Participation in Proceedings of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 64 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1101 (1986) (discussing how agency experimented with reimbursing nonregulated 
individuals and-organizations for costs of their involvement in administrative proceedings). 
278. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 124 (stating that judges are not supposed to talk 
with enacting legislators); see also Dwyer, supra note 13, at 284, 288 (observing that 
agencies are in regular communication with congressional committees, White House, and 
various interest groups); Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 275, at 272 (same). 
279. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 236,309-10 (noting that EPA is not captured agency 
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Because agencies, unlike courts, are often involved in the drafting of 
statutes and the creation of legislative history, agencies are better suited 
than courts, which are third parties to the legislative process, to know when 
the use of legislative history is truly appropriate in reading the statutory 
text.280 Agencies are also more likely than courts to know whether a par-
ticular portion of legislative history is relevant because agency administra-
tors make regular appearances before Congress.281 Moreover, as Chevron 
stated, Congress often explicitly or implicitly delegates policymaking 
authority to an agency. 282 If Congress has delegated such authority, it is 
fair for the agency to consider a statute's legislative history when interpret-
ing a statute because an agency has more freedom than a court to consider 
factors beyond the statutory text, even including the political views of the 
incumbent administration.283 Although it may be proper for courts to treat 
postenactment legislative statements and actions with caution so as to adhere 
to the original intent of the enacting legislature,284 it is more appropriate for 
agencies to consider such materials because Congress expects them to 
consult regularly with congressional oversight committees and because the 
current Congress always has control over the necessary budget resources.2S5 
because many different interest groups monitor its actions); Lazarus, supra note 98, at 364-
66 (arguing that interest group competition and values of typical EPA employee make 
caprure of EPA unlikely); Mank, supra note 256, at 51 (same); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic 
Republican Justificationjor Bureaucratic Decisionmaking, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1511, 1554-
55 (1992) (suggesting that professional training of agency staff decreases possibility of 
agency capture). 
280. See Dwyer, supra note 13, -at 283 (observing that agencies are often involved in 
drafting and amending starutes); Herz, supra note 42, at 199 (commenting that agencies are 
often involved in drafting statutes and creating legislative history). But see Slawson, supra 
note 195, at 401-02, 406-07 (arguing that agencies often use legislative history to justify 
decisions that have little basis in powers delegated by Congress in text). 
281. See generally Lazarus, supra note 273, at 205-39 (discussing congressional 
oversight of EPA). 
282. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
283. See supra text accompanying note 53; supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
284. Intentionalists generally believe that postenactment legislative statements and 
actions are the least reliable form of legislative history because the goal of the interpreter 
is to find the intent of the original enacting legislature rather than to survey current legisla-
tive preferences. See Brudney, supra note 212, at 61-66 (discussing when it is appropriate 
for court to consider postenactment legislative history); Dwyer, supra note 13, at 301; 
Farber & Frickey, supra note 13, at 466-68 (noting arguments against use of subsequent 
legislative history); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom and in 
the Courtroom, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 800, 809-10 (1983) (evaluating drawbacks of 
postenactment legislative materials). , 
285. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 301-02; see also Hazardous Waste Treatment 
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Postenactment legislative information is especially helpful when an agency 
must implement aspirational or symbolic statutory language that has no 
definite original meaning. 286 
Agencies are better equipped to address the practical realities of 
regulatory policy than are courts, which often focus on abstruse princi-
ples.287 The ability of regulatory agencies to reformulate policies and 
interpretations as political administrations change is often a tremendous 
advantage in achieving an interpretation that can maintain majoritarian 
political support.288 Although the administrative costs of variance proce-
dures can be high and there is the danger of political bias, environmental 
agencies can often achieve better individual justice by granting an exemp-
tion to a firm~ if a general regulation imposes unreasonable costs on it in 
relationship to the social benefits gained.289 The relative isolation of federal 
judges makes them better suited for the role of a check against agency 
behavior that exceeds the bounds of the agency's delegated authority than 
for the role of interpreter of the first resort.29O Because courts are not 
institutionally suited to make regulatory policy choices, the judiciary should 
generally defer to agency interpretations that are within the scope of the 
agency's jurisdiction and allow the Congres!) or the President to use pol-
itical or budgetary power to change policies that appear to be ill-advised.291 
Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (declaring that EPA should consider 
post-enactnient legislative comments on same basis as any other comment, but cannot treat 
them as part of statute's legislative history). 
286. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 301-02. 
287. See Diver, supra note 259, at 574-78, 583-85; Dwyer, supra note 13, at 311. 
288. See Diver, supra note 259, at 579-80; Dwyer, supra note 13, at 311-12; Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 81, 95-99 (1985). 
289. See Mank, supra note 277, at 313-26 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of 
variance procedures in environmental decisionmaking). 
290. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATION 171 (1988) (arguing for deferential judicial review unless agency exceeds 
bounds of its congressionally delegated authority); Dwyer, supra note 13, at 312-13 (same). 
291. See Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 
CARDOZO L. REv. 219, 271 (1993) (liThe President has the constitutional authority to insist 
on his own reading of Congress's statutes rather than the agency's. "); Seidenfeld, supra note 
279, at 1551-52 (discussing power of Congress to use budget process to control agencies); 
Seidenfeld, supra note 45, at 117-18 n.184, 136 (discussing power of Congress to use 
budget or confirmation process to control agencies). But see EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 
164-71 (arguing that judicial review is needed to prevent President or agency from interpret-
ing statute in way that majority of Congress would reject). 
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B. An Agency Theory of Statutory Interpretation 
Agencies are not the same as judges. Under Chevron, agencies may 
make policy choices or fill in statutory gaps if Congress has implicitly or 
explicitly delegated authority to the agency and the statute is ambiguous.292 
Accordingly, even if one believes the judiciary should adopt a textualist 
approach to statutory interpretation, courts should not expect agencies to 
employ that methodology within the range of the agency's policymaking 
discretion.293 
Judge Posner has proposed a theory of "imaginative reconstruction" 
that calls onjudges to interstitially fill in statutory gaps by "imagin[ing] as 
best [one] can how the legislators who enacted the statute would have 
wanted it applied to situations they did not foresee. "294 Subsequently, Judge 
Posner has argued that judges interpreting statutes are like platoon com-
manders in battle who are sometimes unable to communicate with superior 
officers, but must face unanticipated circumstances that their orders did not 
contemplate:295 "[R]esponsible platoon commander[s] will ask [themselves] 
what [their] captain[s] would have wanted [them] to do if communications 
should fail, and similarly judges should ask themselves, when the message 
imparted by a statute is unclear, what the legislature would have wanted 
them to do in such a case of failed communication. "296 Judge Posner 
recognizes that some versions of imaginative reconstruction would allow 
judges to impose their views of what constitutes the "public good" when 
there is a statutory gap, but also argues that "judges must make a good-faith 
effort to effectuate legislation regardless of their agreement or disagreement 
with its means or ends. "297 
Professors Farber and Frickey have criticized Judge Posner's approach 
to statutory interpretation because they believe that judges should not 
292. See supra notes 51-52, 62, and accompanying text. 
293. See Herz, supra note 42, at 199. But see EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 
u.s. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("LD]eference is not abdication, and it requires 
us to accept only those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles 
of construction courts normally employ. "). 
294. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 287 (1985); 
Gonzalez, supra note 26, at 607-11 (discussing Judge Posner's theory of imaginative 
reconstruction of statutory intent). 
295. POSNER, supra note 14, at 270; see Farber & Frickey, supra note 13, at 461-65 
(discussing Posner's platoon commander model of statutory interpretation). 
296. POSNER, supra note 14, at 270; see Farber & Frickey, supra note 13, at 461-65. 
297. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 272-74; see also HART & SACKS, supra note 14, 
at 1378 (arguing that judges interpreting statute may assume it was written by "reasonable 
[legislators] pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably"). 
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always choose the statutory interpretation that most probably represents 
Congress's intent in enacting the statute, although judges always should 
follow a clear directive from the legislature.298 Even if interpretation A is 
slightly more likely to represent the legislature's probable intent than 
interpretation B, Farber and Frickey would have a judge select B if the 
policy results of adopting B are significantly better than selecting A.299 
They suggest that judges or agencies need to use a "situation sense" or 
"practical reason" based on their experience and expertise to enable them 
to choose the best interpretation among several competing, plausible choices 
in light of both Congress's most probable intent and the policy conse-
quences of various plausible interpretations.300 
Professor Eskridge's theory of "dynamic statutory interpretation" 
would allow judges to go beyond Congress's probable intent to re-interpret 
a statute in light of changed circumstances. Eskridge argues that Posner's 
platoon commander analogy understates the problem facing judges in 
interpreting statutes because judges, unlike platoon commanders and their 
superior officers, are not normally allowed to communicate with Congress, 
and many statutory orders are decades old, unlike frequently updated 
military orders and, therefore, even more susceptible to unanticipated 
circumstances.301 Eskridge contends that judges should act as "relational 
agent[s]" whose "primary obligation[s] [are] to use [their] best efforts to 
carry out the general goals and specific orders over time. "302 Although 
courts have sometimes implicitly employed dynamic methods. of statutory 
construction when changed circumstances made it impractical or impossible 
to effectuate the original intent of a statute,303 no court has openly adopted 
this method of statutory interpretation and Congress has never approved of 
this approach.304 
298. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 13, at 461-65. 
299. Id. at 462-63. 
300. See id. at 461-65 (proposing that judges should exercise "practical reason" in 
considering both Congress's most probable intent and policy consequences of various 
plausible interpretations); see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 176, at 121-54 (proposing judges 
rely upon "situation sense" about circumstances of life in deciding difficult legal issues); 
Farber, supra note 17, at 533-59 (criticizing formalist approaches to statutory interpretation, 
including textualism, and arguing in favor of practical reason or LIewelIyn's situation sense 
that examines problem of statutory interpretation in light of statuto!), context or purpose). 
301. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 124-25. 
302. See id. at 125. 
303. See id. at 48-80 & passim (proposing dynamic theory of statutory interpretation 
and arguing that courts in many cases implicitly apply such approach). 
304. See McNiven, supra note 33, at 1300-01 (asserting that judicial correction of 
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Most textualists would disagree with Posner's, Farber's and Frickey's, 
and Eskridge's theories of statutory interpretation on the grounds that 
judges or agencies ought to follow the objective statutory intent embodied 
in the language of the statute.305 Adherence to the statutory text must be the 
~ 
nonn in a democratic society, and therefore, if a text mandates an unpopu-
lar result, it is up to Congress, rather than unelected judges or bureaucrats, 
to make a new policy choice.306 As a practical matter, it is difficult for 
either courts or agencies to fonnulate a test to determine when circum-
stances have changed sufficiently or when a statute's goals are too finan-
cially impractical to enforce.307 Once a court or agency is cut loose from 
the text of a statute, it may be difficult for it to decide how to refonnulate 
congressional policy. 303 
If Congress has delegated policymaking discretion to an agency and a 
statute is ambiguous, Chevron implies that agencies can follow Farber's and 
Frickey's approach by selecting a less probable interpretation of a statute 
if that interpretation best serves current policy interests. 309 Posner's search 
for the legislature's probable intent might be an appropriate model for a 
judge, but it is too confining for an agency that must be concerned with 
policy results and the views of the current Congress. Congress often 
expects an agency to go beyond a statute's original intent to make its own 
judgments about unanticipated circumstances as long as the agency periodi-
cally consults with Congress.310 An environmental agency is most likely to 
be effective if it uses its techno-bureaucratic practical reasoning powers to 
balance a reading of Congress's probable intent in enacting a statute with 
statutory errors is "more modest" than that proposed by advocates of dynamic statutory 
interpretation); Nagle, supra note 221, at 1287-88 (same). 
305. See Anthony D'Amato, The Injustice of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 64 U. 
CIN. L. REv. 911, 926-27, 929-32 (1996) (using textualist approach to criticize Posner's and 
Eskridge's theories of statutory interpretation). 
306. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 285. 
307. See id. 
308. See id. 
309. See Nagle, supra note 221, at 1289-90 ("Chevron does not say that an agency must 
interpret a stamte in the manner most faithful to the enacting Congress; an agency need only 
show that its preferred interpretation is not contrary to the original legislative intent. "). 
310. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 283 (arguing that EPA and Congress often engage 
in dialogue about how to reformulate environmental stamtes); McNiven, supra note 33, at 
1298-99 (discussing role of dialogue between agencies and Congress); Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REv. 919, 928 (1989) ("In the modem 
administrative state, the process of law creation, implementation, and interpretation is a 
synergistic process involving an ongoing dialogue among all branches of government, 
including the headless fourth branch - the admini!:trative agencies. H). 
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an examination of the technical, political, and policy issues surrounding dif-
ferent plausible interpretations of the statute.311 The relational agent theory 
makes most sense if an agency is interpreting an old statute and does not 
regularly meet with congressional oversight committees, but environmental 
agencies such as the EPA are in regular contact with both Congress and the 
White House.312 The textualist objection that judges should seek an objec-
tive interpretation of a statute is less persuasive when applied to agencies 
to which Congress has implicitly or explicitly delegated policymaking au-
thority. Some commentators have argued that it is improper for Congress 
to delegate substantial legislative authority to agencies,313 but since 1937 the 
Supreme Court has consistently rejected such nondelegation challenges.314 
Congress could eliminate many of the disagreements between textual-
ists and proponents of "dynamic" or "modified intentionalist" approaches 
to statutory interpretation if the legislature made it clear when an agency 
has discretion to deviate from a statutory command that is impossible or 
impractic81 to implement as written. For instance, Congress C!pl make it 
easier for agencies and courts to address the problem of unrealistic goals or 
deadlines by including explicit severability clauses which would allow the 
EPA to ignore a deadline that proves impracticable to achieve as long as the 
agency is reducing air pollution in a nonattainment area as "expeditiously 
as possible. "315 By expressly providing for the possibility that an agency 
may have to address changed circumstances, Congress can provide legiti-
macy for an agency's actions as a relational agent that may satisfy even 
strict textualists. 
The danger of a textualist approach is that courts will prevent agencies 
from making needed adjustments. There has been a tendency in recent 
years for Congress to write highly specific legislation, especially environ-
mental statutes.316 For instance, the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act 
311. See McGARITY, supra note 269, at 5-6 & passim (proposing and discussing con-
cept of techno-bureaucratic expertise); supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
312. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 284, 288 (noting that agencies are in regular 
communication with congressional committees, White H;ouse, and various interest groups); 
Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 275, at 272 (same). 
313. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT REsPONSIBILITY: How 
CONGRESS ABuSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) (arguing that Congress and 
President, rather than agencies, should make law). 
314. See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36.AM. U. L. REv. 323, 326 
n.20 (1987) ("The year 1937 signaIled the end of the brief Schechter era during which the 
Court invoked the delegation doctrine to invalidate broad delegations of power. H). 
315. See McNiven, supra note 33, at 1308. 
316. See Herz, supra note 42, at 175-82. 
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contain many highly detailed and specific provisions.317 Some environmen-
tal statutes are so specific that an agency must implement the statute's terms 
as embodied in the text, but in other instances an agency may re-interpret 
a statutory phrase so that it makes more sense and still fulfills Congress's 
general purpose in enacting the legislation.318 
Although Professor Lazarus and Ms. Newman apparently believe 
that a textualist approach is useful in part because it prevents the EPA 
from making too many exceptions in favor of industry, 319 such victories 
may be pyrrhic if the EPA must take a rigid approach to environmental 
problems that results in the agency ignoring obvious political problems with 
a statute and, ultimately, in Congress repealing or weakening the pro-
vision.320 As Part V.A discussed, there is some empirical evidence sug-
gesting Congress is more likely to override textualist judicial statutory 
interpretations.321 Indeed, representatives of local governments and the 
combustion industry quickly proposed compromise legislation to overturn 
the City of Chicago decision, although those efforts did not bear immediate 
results.322 
To fulfill Chevron's essence, courts ·should give considerable weight 
to an environmental agency's expertise in interpreting complex environmen-
tal statutes unless the agency is ignoring Congress's intent or purpose in 
317. See iii. at 180-82. 
318. See iii. at 194-203 (arguing that EPA should re-interpret term "average vehicle 
occupancy" in Clean Air Act Section 182(d)(l)(B) to instead mean "average ridership" 
because former interpretation "fails to give credit for some conduct that furthers the statu-
tory goal, i.e., switching to nonautomotive modes of transportation, but gives credit for 
some conduct that conflicts with statutory goals, i.e., switching from nonautomotive modes 
to high-occupancy carpools with a resulting increase in the number of cars"). 
319. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
320. For example, Congress has already allowed states to ignore Clean Air Act Section 
182(d)(I)(B), which required large employers in severe and extreme ozone nonattainment 
areas to limit vehicle use by their employees, as long as the same emission reductions are 
achieved in some other manner. See Clean Air Act: Optional Mandated Trip Reduction, 
Pub. L. No. 104-70, 109 Stat. 773 (1995) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7511a(d)(I)(B) (West 
Supp. 1996»; Nagle, supra note 221, at 1301-02. Even EPA's willingness not to enforce 
sanctions against states that failed to enforce Section 182(d)(I)(B)'s trip-reduction provisions 
was not enough to save the provision from repeal. See H.R. REp. No. 104-387, at 3 (1995) 
(noting that six states during 1995 attempted to avoid implementing carpooling program); 
Air Pollution: States Must Enforce Trip-Reduction Plans, But EPA Says It Will Not Impose 
Sanctions [Current Developments], 25 Env't Rep. (BNA), at 1862 (Feb. 3, 1995) (reporting 
announcement of policy giving assurance that EPA would not sanction states failing to 
enforce carpooling programs). 
321. See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text. 
322. See Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 26-27. 
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enacting the legislation.323 While textualist statutory interpretation can be 
squared with the letter of the Chevron decision, textualists too often fail to 
recognize the spirit of Chevron, which emphasized that agencies are usually 
more competent at interpreting complex regulatory statutes than are genera-
list Article III judges.324 Agencies possess greater technical expertise, are 
closer to the political branches, and are more familiar with the practical 
problems of implementation than are courtS.325 Because. statutory language 
in complex regulatory statutes is often directed at a small interpretive 
community rather than the public at large, a textualist interpretation is less 
likely than an agency's interpretation to embody the probable intent of 
Congress or to reach the best policy result. 
VII. Conclusion 
It may be true, as Professor Lazarus and Ms. Newman argue, that a 
textualist approach on average will result in more victories for environmen-
talists. Nonetheless, Part IV provides a number of counterexamples. More 
importantly, textualism is an unsatisfactory method for reconciling aspira-
tional goals in envirqnmental statutes with other provisions that promote 
flexibility or cost-saving for industry. Even worse, textualists often disre-
gard the careful balancing of such diverse purposes by environmental 
agencies or go out of their way to narrow the authority of agencies. 
Professor Lazarus and Ms. Newman may 'be right that the legislative 
histories of environmental statutes contain more pro-industry exemptions 
than their texts and, therefore, that environmental advocacy groups are 
more likely to win if judges do not consider such material. There are 
,serious theoretical objections, however, that they do not address. To best 
determine Congress's intent, courts and agencies ought to be able to exam-
ine a statute's legislative history. 
Finally, textualists often fail to honor the spirit of Chevron even if they 
follow its explicit dictates. A textualist approach to interpreting complex 
regulatory statutes makes little sense because Congress has written the 
legislation for a particular agency to interpret in light of its experience and 
expertise. One should not expect that ordinary users of the English lan-
guage, including judges, will understand the text, legislative history, or 
practical problems of a complex regulatory statute as well as the administra-
323. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 171 (arguing that even after Chevron, courts 
should reject agency statutory interpretations that are based on "political whim" or inade-
quate factual record). 
324. See supra notes 53-54, 257, 265, and accompanying text. 
325. See supra notes 269-78,287-89, and accompanying text. 
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tive agency in charge of the statute's implementation. As a result, agencies 
are usually better equipped than courts to address the inevitable gaps and 
ambiguities in complex regulatory statutes. Courts should not apply a 
textualist approach to regulatory statutes that implicitly or explicitly grant 
considerable discretion to an agency and rely on the agency's expertise to 
fill in gaps in the statutory scheme. Instead, judges should allow environ-
mental agencies to balance both probable congressional intent and policy 
considerations in interpreting a statute unless the interpretation frustrates 
Congress's intent or purpose in enacting the legislation. Although courts 
should prevent agencies from exceeding their delegated authority, the 
judiciary should recognize that agencies are often comparatively better 
suited to understand the political, technical, and policy ramifications of 
different plausible interpretations of a statute. 
The Sweet Home decision may indicate that the Supreme Court will not 
apply a narrow textualist approach in future environmental cases or may 
merely illustrate how divided the Court is over its approach to legislative 
history and to statutory interpretation. In his Sweet Home dissent, Justice 
Scalia quite correctly pointed out that Justice Stevens's majority opinion 
was inconsistent with the textualist approach in City of Chicago.326 The 
City of Chicago and Sweet Home decisions sent mixed signals to the lower 
courts and left open the possibility that many judges will continue to apply 
a flawed textualist approach to statutory interpretation. President Clinton's 
appointment of Justice Breyer may tilt the Court against a narrow textual-
ism and itt favor of greater deference to administrative agencies, but the 
issue may not be resolved unless and until there are further appointments 
to the Court in President Clinton's second term. 
In the conclusion of their article, Professor Lazarus and Ms. Newman 
acknowledge that textualist judicial decisions often must be followed by 
legislative and regulatory actions to address practical implementation 
problems left unanswered by the Court.3'1:1 They believe, however, that 
strict textualist decisions can force agencies and Congress to confront 
difficult problems that they have avoided in the past. 328 
Although textualist decisions can generate positive political fallout, 
there is the potential danger that literalist judicial interpretations of aspira-
326. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 
2407, 2426-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense 
Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1593 (1994)). 
327. See Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 28-29. 
328. See id. (noting that City of Chicago forced EPA to address preyiously avoided 
issues). 
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tional language will lead to radical legislative reform weakening existing 
environmental laws, especially if the current Congress is hostile to environ-
mental values.329 Instead of trying to convince courts to use textualist 
statutory interpretation as a sledgehammer to force legislative or regulatory 
change, environmentalists should work within the political process to 
achieve incremental change. In light of the environmental movement's long 
success in winning public support and the relative efficacy of environmental 
advocacy groups,330 environmentalists should trust agencies in most cases 
to reach fair decisions without always binding agencies to the deceptively 
clear aspirationallanguage in environmental statutes. 
329. In 1995, many environmental groups charged that the newly elected Republican 
Congress intended to gut existing environmental laws. See NATURAL REsOURCES DEFENSE 
COUNCIL, BREACH OF FAITH: How THE CONTRACT'S FINE PRINT UNDERMINES AMERICA'S 
ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS 4-17 (1995) (arguing H.R. 9, 104th Congo (1995) would seri-
ously weaken several important environmental laws). 
330. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. For example, public support for 
environmentalism forced the Republican-dominated 104th Congress to abandon most of its 
efforts to weaken environmental laws and lead Republicans in 1996 to support bipartisan 
legislation to better protect drinking water, fisheries, and food safety. See S. 39, 104th 
Congo (1996) (fisheries legislation); S. 1316, 104th Congo (1996) (safe drinking water 
legislation); H.R. 1627, l04th Congo (1996) (regulation of pesticides and food safety); Allan 
Freedman, Accomplishments, Missteps Mark Congress' Record, 54 CONGo Q. 2918, 2918-19 
(1996). 
